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Executive summary 
Policymakers in a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are seeking to work with 
food markets and food businesses as part of efforts to reduce undernutrition. These market-
based approaches include national fortification programmes, public food distribution systems, 
new product development and the promotion of biofortified crops. Food markets have clear 
potential to improve diets, including those of many low-income populations. However, current 
market-based approaches generally fail to engage a large and critical portion of these 
markets: informal businesses – particularly food traders, processors and retailers. It is the 
informal sector that supplies much of the food purchased by the poor, delivering products to 
the locations where they live, typically at very low prices. However, food in informal markets 
is often not sufficiently nutrient-rich and can be unsafe. Many policymakers regard the 
informal sector as a barrier to development or believe that it will quickly disappear with the 
spread of supermarkets and centralised food value chains. However, available evidence 
suggests that most food in SSA countries will continue to be sold in informal markets for the 
next several decades, due to broader economic and institutional conditions that favour 
informality. Policy approaches aiming to suppress the informal sector are generally 
ineffective; in some cases, they can actually decrease the quality and safety of food. 
Similarly, food and nutrition policies that simply ignore the informal sector may fail to have 
effects for low-income populations. Finally, nutrition initiatives that include the informal sector 
may contribute to the success of parallel initiatives involving formal businesses, since formal 
businesses generally compete with informal businesses and respond to their behaviours. 
Developing new approaches that engage informal food businesses is therefore an important 
policy priority. Yet programmatic action in the informal sector has not been examined in a 
systematic way in the context of food and nutrition. This Evidence Report helps to address 
this gap by analysing several programmes in other sectors that have sought to improve 
performance in informal markets in SSA. The report groups these programmes into three 
case studies: food safety interventions, programmes targeting small medicine sellers, and 
efforts to promote salt iodisation. 
The review finds that there are substantial benefits of adopting a facilitative approach 
towards informal businesses: in particular ‘light-touch’ interventions centred around training 
and behaviour change can yield significant improvements in the quality of products and 
services. At the same time, these approaches are not panaceas; the case studies emphasise 
that ‘light-touch’ interventions do not lead to technically perfect outcomes: post-intervention 
performance is patchy, and inappropriate products and practices remain. Yet, by triggering 
moderate improvements in informal markets, these programmes may have substantial 
benefits for the poor. 
Beyond documenting impacts, the case studies also provide lessons on the factors 
motivating businesses’ behaviours and on how programmes can shape them. Several case 
studies found that indirect factors were as or more important motivations than short-term 
profit to informal businesses. Reputation and professional standing were also important. 
Furthermore, social and gender factors played a powerful role. For example, one programme 
in Nigeria found that women consistently performed better on food safety than their male 
peers. Interventions should specifically examine social and gender factors in baseline 
assessments and monitoring, and further research is needed to explore how programmes 
can incorporate these considerations into targeting and messaging. At the same time, among 
the factors motivating businesses, profit remains important, and businesses were not willing 
to take actions that undermined their value proposition to customers. 
The reviewed case studies encompass two different models of intervention. Behaviour 
change interventions involved relatively simple actions and limited change to business 
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models. In contrast, ‘role change’ interventions sought to shift businesses’ basic value 
proposition. This second type of intervention required intensive and consistent contact with 
businesses, and depended ultimately on realigning business incentives. Interventions used 
various strategies to simplify or encourage role changes. One such approach was to 
introduce new products or value chain relationships that simplified the tasks required of 
businesses, such as medicines or inputs that were packaged in appropriate quantities. 
Leveraging existing consumer knowledge and practices also demonstrated potential, and 
consumer practices were shown to already be contributing to better health and nutrition 
outcomes. 
In order to incentivise role changes in a context of low regulatory capacity, a number of 
programmes sought to work with community bodies, business associations or other 
business-related institutions. Some programmes reported success from working with well-
established institutions (often cooperatives), while others sought to put in place new 
institutions. These models require further exploration, and research is needed to analyse 
how various types of institutions and incentive structures affect the ability of these 
intermediaries to promote and sustain improved practices. Programmes could specifically 
target organisations that already provide services to businesses and/or mediate access to 
resources (such as infrastructure or production sites), since these are more likely to have 
capacity to shape businesses’ behaviours than are newly created organisations. 
Finally, while ‘light-touch’ interventions can contribute to improvements in the performance of 
businesses and markets in the short term, long-term sustainability will require more 
consistent policy framework for shaping market institutions. Pursuing this and coordinating 
action are roles best suited to capable and accountable public agencies. Business training 
and support programmes should look for opportunities to contribute to better governance, for 
example by improving dialogue between informal businesses and government agencies. At 
the same time, direct investments to build the capacity of public institutions are also 
necessary. 
The reviewed programmes targeting the informal sector highlight the potential of these 
approaches to contribute to better products and better nutrition outcomes; they also 
underscore the substantial gaps in current knowledge about what works. Ultimately, 
investments need to be made to design, implement, evaluate and learn from interventions 
that target the informal food sector. In synthesising current experience, this report aims to 
inform the case for public investment in informal food markets, and to contribute to more 
effective policy and programmatic approaches. 
  
6 
1 Introduction 
A growing number of African governments have declared nutrition to be a key priority in 
national development policies, while donor agencies are increasing funding and advocating 
for nutrition programmes. There is particular emphasis on the role of food markets in shaping 
nutrition, and a growing set of policies and programmes aim to influence how food markets 
function in order to improve access to various nutrient-rich foods1 for undernourished 
populations. The market-based approaches that are being used in these efforts include a 
diverse range of policies, interventions and products,2 ranging from national-scale mandatory 
fortification programmes to publicly funded food distribution, support for new product 
development and promotion of nutrient-rich crops (including biofortified crops) for the 
domestic market. As has been argued elsewhere, the rationale for these policy interventions 
is (a) that markets have the potential to deliver nutrient-rich foods to large numbers of people 
affected by undernutrition (Baer et al. 2013; McClafferty 2015), but that (b) markets tend to 
not function well in delivering nutrient-rich foods to low-income populations, particularly in 
developing countries (Humphrey and Robinson 2015a; Lybbert 2011; Peters et al. 2008). 
This relates to a set of very widespread market failures and constraints which effectively 
disincentivise food businesses from investing in nutrient-rich foods that would be accessible 
to low-income groups.3 Businesses operate in a market environment of rules, regulations, 
suppliers and customers over which they have limited control.4 There is therefore a clear 
case for policy interventions to improve the market environments in which businesses 
operate (Humphrey and Robinson 2015a; Koh, Hegde and Karamchandani 2014). Policies 
and interventions can help overcome some of the common market failures and can actively 
shape how markets function in order to realise their potential for nutrition. However, the 
market-based approaches to food and nutrition that are currently being developed funded by 
development agencies and public–private partnerships have a critical gap; they largely fail to 
engage informal businesses and the markets and institutional contexts in which they function 
(the definition of ‘informality’ is discussed in Section 1.1). This substantially reduces or 
negates these programmes’ contributions to improving nutrition among low-income 
populations – the very groups that are most affected by undernutrition (see Box 1.1). Since 
most economic activity in African food systems is informal, and since the poor are particularly 
reliant on these informal systems (see Section 1.2, below), developing new approaches that 
engage informal food markets should be a key priority as part of nutrition policy efforts. 
  
                                               
1 This report adopts a very broad definition of nutrient-rich foods, to include any food item with substantial levels of key 
micronutrients or protein, including naturally nutrient-rich foods such as pulses, vegetables or animal foods, biofortified crops 
and processed foods with high levels of micronutrients resulting from nutrient-rich ingredients or from micronutrient fortification. 
We also include supplements that are intended to be added to existing foods, such as micronutrient powders. In order to 
contribute to good nutrition, any food needs to be part of a balanced diet and must be used in a way that maintains nutrient 
content and the body’s ability to uptake nutrients (particularly important for infants). What should be defined as ‘nutrient-rich’ or 
‘nutritious’ is a contested and controversial area. Because informal markets are a new area for nutrition policy, with very lim ited 
evidence, this report considers the potential for working with the informal sector across all types of foods. 
2 This policy trend is also occurring amidst calls to coordinate nutrition policy with other priorities, particularly increasing 
agricultural productivity, achieving domestic food self-sufficiency and fostering the development of domestic agri-business. 
3 Two overlapping sets of constraints make nutrition a particularly problematic area for markets: (1) ‘bottom of the pyramid’ 
challenges that increase the costs of building markets that serve low-income populations, and (2) problems specific to nutrition, 
particularly the ‘invisibility’ of micronutrients in food, which makes it difficult for consumers to make rational choices among 
different foods and products. These constraints make nutrient-rich foods for the poor a particularly risky proposition for 
businesses, and thus, although a range of formal sector food businesses produce foods in African countries, very few of these 
products are rich in micronutrients – and those that are (particularly fortified products, such as fortified cereals or margarine), are 
sold as premium products aimed at upper-income groups. 
4 These are described by Monitor Inclusive Markets as ‘business ecosystem constraints’ (Koh et al. 2014). 
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Box 1.1 Which economic groups should be targeted by food-based 
nutrition interventions? 
The poorest populations suffer the highest rates of undernutrition, as well as its most severe 
consequences (Black et al. 2008). Yet undernutrition also affects very large numbers of people in 
the ‘middle’ wealth groups in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In Kenya, Nigeria and 
Tanzania, stunting rates are at or above 30 per cent for all groups except the wealthiest 20 per cent 
(see Table 1.1). There is therefore a need for various nutrition interventions that effectively target 
the majority of the population; but these must be adapted to the needs of different groups. 
Table 1.1 Proportion of children under five years classified as stunted 
in the bottom wealth quintile, ‘middle’ three quintiles, and the top 
quintile in four SSA countries (%) 
Wealth group Ghana Kenya Nigeria Tanzania 
Bottom 35.1 44.4 52.1 48.4 
Middle 27.9 34.2 41.5 42.9 
Top 14.4 24.5 24.2 26.3 
Note: The middle line is the mean of the second, third and fourth quintiles. 
Sources: National Demographic Health surveys (Ghana Statistical Service, Ghana Health Service and ICF Macro 2009; 
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and ICF Macro 2010; National Population Commission and ICF Macro 2009; National 
Bureau of Statistics and ICF Macro 2011). 
Differentiating among target groups is particularly relevant for market-based interventions, since 
wealth groups have very different levels and types of engagement with markets. They need to be 
realistic about the proportion of the population that will primarily benefit from various types of market 
interventions. Different countries in SSA have varying rates of extreme and ‘moderate’ poverty (see 
Table 1.2). 
For people earning less than US$1.25 per day (making up 26–67 per cent of the population of 
countries in SSA5) market-based approaches alone will not provide adequate nutrition, since 
households in this group face severe income constraints and are frequently unable to meet even 
calorie requirements. While market-based programmes can reduce the costs of healthy foods, no 
low-cost product will provide adequate nutrients, since assets and incomes are the key constraints. 
The provision of social protection and asset building are essential. 
For people earning between US$1.25 and US$2 per day (15–28 per cent of the population) 
market-based approaches may be able to increase their access to a healthy diet. These wealth 
groups make regular or occasional food purchases. Their restricted spending power means that the 
majority of their food purchases are from informal markets (see below). 
Table 1.2 Proportion of population living on less than US$1.25 per day 
(‘one dollar poverty’); and proportion living on between US$1.25 and 
US$2 in four SSA countries (%) 
Poverty level Ghana Kenya Nigeria Tanzania 
1 dollar poverty 28.6 43.4 62.0 43.5 
1 to 2 dollar poverty 23.3 23.8 20.2 29.5 
Sources: World Bank (2015). Data from latest available year: Ghana 2005, Kenya 2005, Nigeria 2010, Tanzania 2012. 
                                               
5 Source: World Development Indicators, country averages 2004–13 (World Bank 2015). 
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1.1 What is the informal food sector? 
The informal food sector refers to economic actors in agri-food value chains who operate to 
varying degrees outside centralised regulations, institutions and record-keeping. The concept 
of informality has been used in a large number of different ways. An encompassing definition 
was put forward by the International Conference of Labour Statisticians: 
The informal sector may be broadly characterised as consisting of units engaged in 
the production of goods or services… [that] typically operate at a low level of 
organisation, with little or no division between labour and capital as factors of 
production and on a small scale. Labour relations – where they exist – are based 
mostly on casual employment, kinship or personal and social relations rather than 
contractual arrangements with formal guarantees. 
(OECD 2002: 162) 
The sector is large, and can account for the majority of employment and as much as 39 per 
cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in many countries (Porta and Schleifer 2014). 
Focusing on food production, processing and marketing, the informal food sector includes 
nearly all farmers, most traders in agri-commodity markets and many micro- and small-scale 
food processors and food retailers. In order to delineate a manageable scope for the review, 
this report focuses specifically on the ‘downstream’ portion of the informal food system: food 
processors, distributors and retailers. 
What makes a particular food business or institution ‘informal’ varies from one context to 
another. In some countries and markets, authorities consider the lack of a particular 
technology/standard (e.g. milk traders without a cold chain) to make a business 
informal/illegal. In other cases, the location of a business away from official infrastructure 
(e.g. street vendors), a lack of systematic sanitary inspection or simply the failure to register 
with the appropriate authority constitutes informality. Whichever definition is used in a 
specific case, informal businesses generally use ‘production processes [that] rely on high 
levels of working capital as against fixed capital. Formal contracts between employers and 
employees or between buyers and sellers are rare and the often-invisible activities involved 
usually fall below, or outside, the fiscal net’ (Yasmeen 2001: 33). However, being informal 
does not mean a business has no contact with the ‘formal sector’. Many small enterprises 
pay taxes, fees or bribes to local authorities. Similarly, many businesses are organised into 
trade associations or cooperatives (Shephard 2005; Simon 2007), and their behaviours may 
be regulated by various ‘traditional’ institutions and norms. 
1.2 The informal sector dominates food provision to low- and 
middle-income groups 
Since informal businesses are not covered by most official surveys or registration processes, 
data are scarce on the precise extent of the informal food economy. Some data exist for 
specific value chains, particularly fruits, vegetables and animal foods. Surveys have found ‘in 
Kenya, Uganda, and Mali, raw milk produced by smallholders and sold by vendors or small-
scale retailers, accounts for an estimated 80 per cent, 90 per cent, and 98 per cent of 
marketed milk in each country’ (Grace et al. 2010), while 42 per cent of milk in Kenya is sold 
directly from farmers to consumers (Omore and Baker 2011: 17). A similar picture holds for 
fruits and vegetables, with value chains composed of small producers and traders 
representing the majority of domestic markets (see Figure 1.1). 
Although data on the informal sector are scarce, available data on formal food markets in 
sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries indicate they have very limited coverage overall, and 
suggest that the remainder of demand is met through informal provision. For example, 
despite their recent entry and growth in urban markets, supermarkets continue to occupy a 
narrow niche within food retail in SSA countries, and their reach will continue to be marginal 
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for the next several decades (Humphrey 2007; Tschirley et al. 2009). In Kenya (the country 
with the second-greatest number of supermarkets in SSA), supermarkets make up only      
11 per cent of urban food retail (and much less in rural areas) (Tschirley et al. 2009). Most 
consumers simply cannot afford to shop in supermarkets, and even those who can continue 
to prefer informal retailers for certain foods, particularly fresh fruits, vegetables and animal 
foods (Omore and Baker 2011). In Kenya, 78 per cent of supermarket shoppers purchase 
only dry foods, preferring to use small shops and open markets for fresh foods (Grace and 
Omore 2007).6 
Figure 1.1 Market shares in the modern and traditional sectors for fresh 
fruit and vegetables 
 
Source: Adapted from Gómez and Ricketts (2013). 
Household consumption surveys7 provide another source of data on the reach of the informal 
sector. These too, suggest that the majority of consumers in both low- and middle-income 
groups purchase informal products. The findings are striking since surveys cover precisely 
the bulk, dry goods where large manufacturers would be expected to have a comparative 
advantage. In Tanzania, only one-fifth of people in the bottom three wealth quintiles 
purchased centrally produced maize flour. The large majority used whole maize (whether 
they produced it themselves or purchased it) and brought it to small millers for processing 
(National Bureau of Statistics and ICF Macro 2011). Similarly, only 28 per cent of people in 
the bottom three wealth quintiles purchased cooking oil produced by large manufacturers; 
the remainder either did not use oil, made oil at home or sourced it from informal producers 
(ibid.). Similar patterns are seen in Ghana, where the poorest are most likely to use locally 
produced shea butter for cooking, while the ‘middle’ three wealth quintiles are most likely to 
use palm oil (some of which is made by formal businesses, and some of which is informal) 
(Ghana Statistical Service et al. 2009). Only among the wealthiest 20 per cent of Ghanaians 
did more than half use centrally produced and fortified vegetable oil (52 per cent of this 
group) (ibid.).8 
                                               
6 Supermarkets held only 2 per cent of the fresh food market in 2003 (Tschirley et al. 2009: 221). 
7 Nationwide surveys are available in only a handful of countries in SSA. These have been conducted as part of National 
Demographic Health Surveys, and have focused on products covered by national fortification programmes (especially vegetable 
oil and salt). 
8 46 per cent of the poorest one-fifth of Ghanaians consume shea butter; 64 per cent of the middle three-fifths of the population 
consume palm oil. Of the poorest four-fifths of the population, only 18 per cent use fortified vegetable oil, and this is heavily 
concentrated in the second-wealthiest quintile (Ghana Statistical Service et al. 2009). 
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There are some exceptions to the dominance of the informal sector in SSA food markets. For 
some products and in some countries, poor people do purchase centrally produced foods. 
These products tend to be low-cost, imported staples such as wheat flour, or essential 
products that cannot be produced locally, such as salt. Yet when the poor purchase these 
products, they often do so in very small quantities. The poorest 20 per cent of Tanzanians 
consume on average only 3g of centrally produced wheat flour per day, compared to 18g per 
day consumed by the median household (Jorgensen 2011). 
One reason that the informal sector is so strongly represented in African food systems is that 
it is better able to provide foods that meet sociocultural expectations and that are available in 
places convenient for poor consumers. Critically, informal enterprises can often offer 
products at dramatically cheaper prices than can formal businesses. For example, 
complementary foods produced by ‘kitchen enterprises’ in Ghana are available for as little as 
one-fifth the price of multinational brands, and half the price of products made by formal 
Ghanaian businesses (Anim-Somuah et al. 2013a).9 In Nairobi, Kenya, informally traded milk 
costs less than 60 per cent of that of packaged milk (Grace 2014). Crucially, however, 
although these products are cheaper, their quality can vary widely; some may be adequate 
while others are potentially harmful.10 Low prices in part reflect informal businesses’ low fixed 
costs and their avoidance of business regulations and manufacturing standards. It can also 
reflect the fundamental quality and safety of products – but not necessarily. While 
policymakers tend to assume that informal foods are less safe and less nutritious compared 
to packaged, formal sector products, this is not always the case (see Box 1.2). 
 
Box 1.2 Informal sector products are not necessarily of inferior 
quality 
Policymakers and food safety planners often assume that all informal sector products are of inferior 
quality and pose a threat to public health. Detailed research, however, challenges these 
assumptions. A research programme on food safety led by the International Livestock Research 
Institute (ILRI) found that, although informal animal foods frequently contained pathogens that can 
cause food-borne disease, they did not necessarily increase risks to human health. First, packaged, 
formal sector products were not necessarily safer than informal ones: in the case of milk in Kenya, 
formal sector products actually had lower compliance than informal products (Grace and Omore 
2007: 158). Second, consumers commonly had knowledge and practices that allowed them to avoid 
food safety risks (for example, by cooking/boiling products before eating) (Omore and Baker 2011). 
This highlights the importance of distinguishing between ‘hazards’ and ‘risks’ in food safety policy; 
some products may have a high level of hazards (pathogens), yet very low risks (instances of food-
borne illness) because of consumers’ practices. 
This is not to say that informal sector products are wholly safe or nutritionally adequate; the majority 
are not. Products vary widely in quality. For example, testing of formal and informal packaged 
complementary foods in urban Ghana found that the nutritional quality of products varied 
dramatically; while some locally made products contained levels of micronutrients equivalent to 
international brands, others were deeply inadequate in micro- and macronutrient content (Masters, 
Kuwornu and Sarpong 2011). The lesson is that informal sector products have the potential to 
perform well on nutritional quality and food safety, and are not necessarily worse than formal sector 
products. Policymakers should not assume that informal products are inherently ‘bad’. A more 
effective and realistic policy approach would seek to create incentives for informal sector 
businesses to improve the quality of their products. 
 
                                               
9 Complementary foods are a diverse set of foods ‘that are readily consumed and digested by [a] young child and that provide 
addition nutrition to meet all the growing child’s needs’ (UNICEF n.d.). In order to grow and be healthy, children from 6 to 24 
months old need adequate nutrients from complementary foods while continuing to receive breastmilk. To be nutritionally 
adequate, foods must not only contain the correct nutrients, but must be given to children in proper ways and amounts. 
10 In the case of complementary foods in Ghana, the cheapest informal product was simply roasted maize flour, which is totally 
inadequate for infant nutrition. Nonetheless, the cheapest products are the relevant point of comparison for income-constrained 
households. 
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That informal businesses predominate in African economies is no coincidence; economic 
and institutional conditions in many countries favour informality. One key factor is the very 
low institutional capacity of regulatory bodies – whether public or private. In general, central 
institutions have almost no ability to monitor the large numbers of small businesses, let alone 
to impose regulations or standards (Grace and Omore 2007). The lack of capacity is often 
extreme. For example, Tanzania’s food regulator has only four zonal offices across the 
country, each of which must cover several regions. The office in Dodoma Region has two 
staff, who are expected to cover an area with between 1,000 and 2,000 small food 
processors (Abt Associates, Inc 2012). Low capacity is not limited to the food sector. In Kano 
State, Nigeria, one study found that the federal government was able to cover only 15 per 
cent of medicine sellers in its registration lists (Goodman et al. 2007) (the case of medicine 
sellers is examined in detail in Section 4). The lack of concentrated infrastructure and the 
diffuse nature of food production and consumption also make it difficult to regulate small 
businesses. This does not mean that there are no rules governing the behaviours of informal 
businesses; they often interact with business and market associations and comply with local 
norms. These types of institutions are not amenable to conventional top-down policy 
approaches (although, as discussed below, innovative approaches may be able to catalyse 
their potential). Clearly, there is a need to strengthen the capacity of national- and local-level 
regulatory bodies. Yet it is not realistic to expect that they will be able to enforce standards in 
the short term – whether for nutritional quality, food safety, etc. 
 
Box 1.3 Market barriers inhibiting nutrient-rich foods 
Although the informal sector plays an important role in providing low-cost foods to the poor, the 
catastrophic rates of undernutrition in many countries make it clear that it fails to provide adequate 
nutrition. This is not by chance: markets – both formal and informal – generally fail to supply 
adequate nutrients because of widespread market failures and other constraints. These problems 
generally affect all types of businesses. Principal among these are low levels of awareness of and 
demand for many nutrient-rich foods, and the ‘invisibility’ of micronutrient content in foods. 
‘Invisibility’ – known in economics as a credence good problem11 – is particularly a problem for 
processed and fortified foods, where the nutrient content cannot be distinguished by buyers, except 
by relying on label information. In most SSA countries, labels are either absent or may misrepresent 
true nutritional value. 
These market constraints are compounded by the very low purchasing power of the poor. While it is 
possible to create products with high nutrient content, and to market them as premium brands in 
order to differentiate them from nutrient-poor products, both of these strategies increase the costs of 
products. Low-income consumers, faced with paying more for premium branded products, opt for 
cheaper nutrient-poor foods. Furthermore, since the branding strategy depends on the ability to 
exclude others from using one’s brand, this option is generally not available to informal businesses. 
Thus, informal businesses are generally the purveyors of low-cost, low-nutrition foods that appeal to 
the poor, while medium and large formal businesses sell branded, fortified products to middle- and 
upper-income groups. The cases examined below describe policy approaches that can mitigate 
these constraints without relying on branding, and in ways that are adapted to the conditions faced 
by informal businesses. 
Source: Humphrey and Robinson (2015b). 
In sum, informal businesses and the markets in which they operate represent most economic 
activity in African food systems and are the major sources of food not only for the poorest 
groups, but for 60–80 per cent of the population in most countries. This situation is likely to 
persist for the coming decades, despite continued globalisation and growth of African 
economies (Tschirley et al. 2009). Food-based nutrition policies and programmes must 
therefore first recognise the contribution of informal food systems to current nutrition and 
                                               
11 This challenge also affects other products where there is a substantial information asymmetry between the producer and 
consumer of a product or service. Health-care services and pharmaceuticals are also very widely impacted by this problem. 
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health. But recognition alone is inadequate; there is a need for policies and programmes to 
enhance the performance of informal systems and upgrade the nutritional (and food safety) 
qualities of their products. This poses a major challenge for the current generation of food 
and nutrition initiatives. 
1.3 The policy gap: neglect of the informal sector leads to missed 
opportunities for nutrition 
Political support and funding for food-based nutrition among governments and donor 
agencies have focused on a handful of policy approaches, including national fortification 
programmes, promotion of biofortified crops and publicly funded distribution of supplements 
and therapeutic foods. Yet very few programmes have attempted to engage the informal food 
sector. Instead, the general orientation of food policy efforts is either to ignore the informal 
sector or to attempt to repress it (Grace and Omore 2007).12 Evidence and experience 
indicate that both of these responses risk limiting the effectiveness and coverage of food-
based approaches to nutrition, missing opportunities to reach larger numbers of people. In 
the worst cases, neglect of the informal sector can actually compromise programmes’ 
success. 
The majority of food-based nutrition programmes simply do not take account of the informal 
sector in their design and implementation. Examining the record of national fortification 
programmes provides an indication of how ignoring the informal sector can hamper 
achievement of nutrition objectives. While mandatory fortification programmes have achieved 
successes in a number of products by covering centrally produced and imported products 
(such as wheat flour), they have been ineffective in fortifying products for which there is 
significant informal sector presence – including both the products of small businesses and 
those of large manufacturers who compete with small businesses (Robinson et al. 2014a; 
Robinson et al. 2014b).13 There are two ways in which this reduces the impact of these 
programmes among low- and middle-income groups: first, as discussed above, low-income 
households, particularly those in rural areas, simply do not consume the centrally produced 
products targeted for fortification. Second, even when low-income groups do consume these 
products, the universal coverage of fortification means that the doses of micronutrients 
delivered are not sufficient.14 
Neglecting the informal sector can also endanger nutrition objectives in programmes that 
promote voluntary fortification. Whenever formal sector businesses compete with smaller, 
informal ones, market pressures will direct the formal businesses to differentiate their 
products and market them as premium goods targeted to wealthier populations. As a result, 
the price gap between formal and informal products remains wide, and access for lower-
income consumers is low. This outcome was observed in Nigeria after donors supported a 
successful mid-sized business to develop a fortified cereal product (Nwuneli et al. 2014).15 
Finally, failing to account for informality can actually lead to unanticipated negative impacts 
from business-oriented programmes. In Ghana, for example, a donor-funded programme 
                                               
12 There are exceptions: for instance, development of locally sourced cereal-legume complementary food products in West 
Africa specifically targeted small-scale entrepreneurs and women’s groups. Among biofortification programmes, the Reaching 
End Users project in Mozambique worked with small market traders to incorporate biofortified orange-fleshed sweet potato into 
existing local/regional marketing systems for vegetables and tubers. Nonetheless, these do not characterise the majority of 
food-based nutrition programmes, and were small-scale projects. 
13 For example, in Tanzania, the one large manufacturer that had produced maize flour recently stopped producing this product 
due to competition from small-scale processors. 
14 This is because fortification levels must be set in order to ensure no toxic effects for those people who eat the most of a 
fortified product, while there are very large disparities in consumption levels between rich and poor households. In Tanzania the 
wealthiest consume 125g of wheat flour per day, seven times the median consumption level of 18g per day (Jorgensen 2011). 
As a result, fortification cannot deliver substantial doses of nutrients to low-income consumers. 
15 Similarly, in Tanzania, only one large manufacturer produced maize flour due to intense competition from small millers, and 
this manufacturer recently withdrew this product. 
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developed several aflatoxin-free groundnut products16 with the aim of reducing public health 
risks. However, this had the unanticipated effect of exacerbating health risks for the urban 
poor, since contaminated supplies rejected by formal businesses were channelled into 
informal markets and sold at lower prices (Anim-Somuah et al. 2013a). 
While nutrition programmes tend to simply ignore the informal sector, broader food policy in 
SSA tends to actively repress it.17 This tends to take the form of regulatory ‘crackdowns’ in 
which agents confiscate equipment, extract fines and bribes and forcibly remove businesses 
from their premises (which are often not zoned for business use). However, research has 
shown that crackdowns are generally ineffective, and can even be counterproductive in 
achieving public health objectives. First, evidence from a number of countries shows that 
these enforcement efforts generally do not succeed in driving informal businesses out of the 
market (Simon 2007). They do, however, drive them ‘deeper’ into informality, making them 
more difficult for government and civil society actors to engage. Second, crackdowns can 
lead to decreases in the quality of food products, since pressure from regulators 
disincentivises businesses from investing in equipment or upgrades. Research in Brazil 
found that when regulators imposed stricter rules on small butcheries, food safety problems 
worsened (Azevedo and Bankuti 2003). Meanwhile, in Uganda, milk producers who had had 
no contact with regulatory agencies tended to use better safety practices than those who had 
experienced regulatory pressure (Grace et al. 2010). Although no studies have examined 
how crackdowns affect the nutritional quality of products, a similar negative effect is 
plausible. 
In sum, there is a need to develop alternative policy and programmatic approaches; neither 
ignoring nor repressing the informal food sector is an effective basis for food-based nutrition 
policies and programmes. The objectives of these new policies are to shape the behaviours 
of informal businesses in ways that lead to products that are safer and contain higher 
nutritional value, greater consumer awareness and ultimately healthier diets and practices for 
key populations. If programmes can create incentives for informal businesses to change their 
behaviours on a sustainable basis, they have the potential to achieve large-scale impacts in 
the short and medium term and to reach groups suffering from high levels of undernutrition. 
Yet whether this potential can be achieved – and how – has not been examined in a 
systematic way. Building an evidence base in this area should therefore be a priority for food 
and nutrition policymaking. 
The lack of evidence on nutrition in informal markets and how it can be improved relates to 
the absence of policies and interventions in this area (for exceptions see Box 1.4). Yet, unlike 
nutrition, other sectors have built substantial bodies of experience and evidence on how to 
shape informal markets. This presents a substantial opportunity for food and nutrition policy 
to learn from these other sectors, including understanding the menu of policy and 
programmatic options, what factors contribute to successful interventions and what kinds 
(and magnitudes of) results can be expected. This report aims to provide precisely these 
lessons by reviewing documented research and experience in several sectoral case studies 
of interventions targeting the informal sector. The report is based on a review of a range of 
programmes and policies in food, agriculture and manufacturing sectors, which led to the 
identification of three case studies. Each of these cases has significant commonalities with 
the problem of strengthening nutrition (how these cases were selected is discussed in 
Section 2). In synthesising available evidence and experience from these sectors, this report 
aims to contribute to the development of a new generation of food-based nutrition 
                                               
16 Aflatoxin is a harmful compound produced by strains of mould that grow on grains. Aflatoxin ingestion is associated with liver 
disease, cancer and immune system suppression and may contribute to undernutrition in infants and young children. 
17 In fact, policy objectives in many SSA countries are conflicting, with policies focused on food safety (as well as transport, 
infrastructure and investment) often oriented towards repressing informal activity, while employment and small and medium-
sized enterprise policies encourage small-scale enterprises. The results are often inconsistent and erratic policy environments, 
with periods of tolerance punctuated by periodic crackdowns, particularly in urban areas (Grace and Omore 2007; Simon 2007). 
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programmes that take account of the dynamics of informal markets. Ultimately, in order to 
rigorously assess informal markets’ potential for nutrition, new nutrition interventions need to 
be designed, implemented and evaluated. This will obviously require support from key policy 
actors and adequate funding. In synthesising lessons from other sectors, this report aims to 
inform the case for investment in informal food markets, and to contribute to programme 
design. 
 
Box 1.4 Experience of working with informal markets in nutrition 
programmes 
Introducing more nutritious complementary foods in Ghana 
In the 1980s, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the Ghana Health Service 
introduced an improved complementary food known as weanimix, which combined locally available 
ingredients. Originally promoted for small-scale processing, the product became popular and small 
enterprises began producing the product in urban areas. This has been a partial success, as only a 
minority of weanimix products are nutritionally adequate. Nonetheless, the intervention successfully 
tapped into the strengths of the informal food sector, leading to rapid diffusion of a nutrition-sensitive 
technology and reaching large numbers of poor consumers. This success appears to result from the 
focus on a popular traditional food, use of simple technology and the provision of training and 
business skills to women entrepreneurs. Sources: Agble (1996) and Anim-Somuah et al. (2013b). 
Working towards fortification at small and medium scale in Tanzania 
Two donor-funded initiatives in Tanzania are aiming to increase fortification by small and medium 
enterprises involved in processing maize flour and vegetable oils: these are the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) Tuboreshe Chakula project and the Rural Food 
Fortification programme, which is coordinated by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. 
Tuboreshe Chakula, which has operated for several years longer than the Rural Food Fortification 
programme, has provided training and business support services to 733 businesses. Many 
businesses have improved their management and hygiene practices, with 60 per cent of 
participating businesses reporting greater profitability. However, progress on fortification has been 
slow, particularly after national regulatory agencies insisted that all businesses be formally 
registered before beginning fortification. A handful of participating businesses reported interest in 
fortification because it would contribute to national development, and strengthen their reputation. 
Source: Pittore and Robinson (2015). 
Promoting biofortified foods through rural traders and food sellers 
A sequence of projects in Mozambique and Uganda have sought to encourage private sector actors 
in informal food systems to deal in vitamin A-rich orange-fleshed sweet potato (OFSP). Projects 
supported the breeding of new varieties, disseminated planting material and ran social marketing 
campaigns. They also worked with market traders and food retailers, linking them to farmers 
producing OFSP and asking them to promote OFSP with their customers as part of the social 
marketing campaigns. The distinctive orange colour was used as the basis for the marketing 
campaign, and served to distinguish OFSP from other sweet potato varieties. The low price and low 
status of sweet potato limited demand from wealthier consumers, contributing to its affordability in 
the poor districts that were targeted. However, increasing the seasonal availability of OFSP and 
incorporating it into value-added products such as bread was difficult, in part because bakers 
require a regular supply and are not willing to pay more for OFSP than they would for more 
conventional wheat flour. Sources: Coote et al. (2011) and Westby, Coote and Tomlins (2011). 
Piloting informal retail of micronutrient powders in Kenya 
There have also been attempts to use the informal sector’s distribution capacity to market centrally 
produced products. A number of programmes, including trials in Kenya and Ghana, are 
experimenting with distribution of micronutrient powders (or ‘sprinkles’) to poor populations. This 
includes working with village-based entrepreneurs who sell the powders (which are often imported) 
alongside their normal products. This approach gets around microenterprises’ limited capacity to 
formulate micronutrient-enhanced products by instead making them retailers of a centrally produced 
product. Sources: Nakao, Responsibility and Co (2014) and Suchdev et al. (2012). 
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2 Methods 
The research was carried out through a desk-based review of scholarly literature and project 
documents. The documents reviewed included a range of different study types, including 
econometric analyses of the drivers of behaviour of informal actors, evaluations of the 
impacts of interventions (using various study designs) and documentation of a particular 
project’s activities and processes of change. The review took place in two stages: first, a 
wide-ranging search of online databases (Google Scholar) led to the identification of five 
case studies/bodies of research, each of which was sufficiently documented. These case 
studies referred to various sectors and value chain stages, namely: food processing and 
retail, health care and medicine provision, agricultural production, small-scale manufacturing 
and retail of fast-moving consumer goods. Second, three of these case studies were 
selected for detailed analysis and inclusion in the report. Two selection criteria were used:  
(a) the relevance of the case/sector/market to the problem of improving nutrition in informal 
markets and (b) having an adequate level of detail on intervention activities and outcomes. 
The articles reviewed and the selection criteria are listed in the Annex. 
For each of the three case studies selected for inclusion, new online searches were 
conducted (Google and Google Scholar) and citations were ‘snowballed’ in order to 
assemble all relevant documents that could be feasibly collected. The three case studies are: 
1. interventions to improve food safety in the informal sector; 
2. interventions to improve performance of informal medicine sellers; 
3. interventions to promote iodisation by informal salt producers. 
Only cases relevant to the manufacturing/processing, distribution and retail stages of the 
value chain were selected. There were two reasons for this selection: the first was to 
delineate a coherent and meaningful focus for the review. The actors, incentives and 
behaviours involved in the ‘downstream’ stages of the value chain are distinct to those at the 
stage of agricultural production.18 It was thus determined the review would be more coherent 
if it focused on only one end of the value chain. Second, the ‘downstream’ stages were 
selected because they tend to have a more direct impact on nutrition, since they ultimately 
determine what kinds of foods are available in consumer markets and also interact directly 
with consumers (Humphrey and Robinson 2015b). It is important to acknowledge that 
behaviours in the ‘upstream’ end of informal value chains can have direct implications for 
food-based nutrition interventions, most prominently including biofortification,19 preventing 
aflatoxin contamination (Anim-Somuah et al. 2013b) or reducing post-harvest losses. Yet, 
even in these cases, better understanding of the downstream end of informal value chains is 
also important. For example, achieving widespread consumption of biofortified crops requires 
that they are available in consumer markets, which requires the involvement of traders, 
processors and retailers – the majority of whom are informal (Waized et al. 2015). 
In sum, this review focuses on analysing case studies of action to shape informal businesses 
involved in processing, distributing and retailing products to low-income populations in order 
to provide lessons for how nutrition programmes can effectively target informal actors in the 
food system. Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this report describe each of the three case studies; the 
conclusion aims to synthesise lessons across the case studies and relate them to the 
nutrition challenge. 
                                               
18 One case study relating to agricultural production was reviewed: integrated pest management. 
19 ‘Biofortification is the process by which the nutritional quality of food crops is improved through agronomic practices, 
conventional plant breeding, or modern biotechnology. Biofortification differs from conventional fortification in that biofortification 
aims to increase nutrient levels in crops during plant growth rather than through manual means during processing’ (World Health 
Organization 2015). 
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3 Case study: Using facilitative approaches to 
improve food safety 
3.1 Background 
There are a number of important commonalities between the goals of improving food safety 
and improving food-based nutrition. Achieving both objectives involves influencing the 
behaviour of private sector actors in the food system in a way that improves the performance 
of the foods and value chains used by the low-income majority. In SSA countries, food safety 
and nutrition programmes intervene in food systems dominated by the informal sector. Food 
safety offers useful lessons for nutrition because of a handful of experimental programmes 
and linked research studies that have tested ways to increase food safety among small and 
informal food processors and retailers. Research has compared the outcomes of these 
experimental approaches to conventional policy models based on command-and-control 
regulation. This section of the report describes two related experimental programmes led by 
the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) in Kenya and Nigeria (Grace et al. 
2012a; Omore and Baker 2011). These have been part of a broader body of work in several 
African and South Asian countries (Grace and Omore 2007; Grace 2014; Grace et al. 2010). 
As mentioned in the introduction, the policy context for food safety in SSA countries tends to 
be contradictory: most governments’ policies aim to restrict or eliminate informal food 
businesses, yet government agencies severely lack capacity to do so. As a result, policy 
implementation tends to be highly inconsistent and can actually exacerbate food safety 
problems (Azevedo and Bankuti 2003). ILRI developed an approach that aimed to help 
address these problems through participatory risk and hazard analysis. Working with 
government agencies and informal sector actors, research teams from ILRI studied particular 
food value chains and sought to locate the points where risks occurred, and identified 
feasible actions that businesses could use to address the risks (Grace et al. 2008). Pilot 
projects were implemented to provide training and low-cost technologies to groups of 
informal food processors (Grace 2011). Two of these projects are described below. While the 
first – focusing on raw milk value chains in Kenya – found that consumer practices were 
already effective in reducing food safety risks, the second – focusing on butchers in Nigeria – 
found evidence of widespread health problems. The projects also intervened in markets with 
different degrees of organisation; in the Nigeria case, producer associations exerted powerful 
influence over businesses’ behaviours, while in Kenya milk traders were not organised. The 
two cases provide lessons on how food and nutrition programmes can adapt their 
approaches to different market contexts. 
3.2 The smallholder dairy project in Kenya 
In Kenya, 80 per cent of the milk sold is in the form of unpasteurised ‘raw milk’, which is 
produced and distributed by informal actors. Consumers prefer raw milk to centrally 
produced packaged milk (Grace et al. 2010). While policymakers in Kenya have tended to 
assume that raw milk is a public health risk, ILRI research found that the level of risk was 
actually low. Although the milk contained pathogens, Kenyan consumers habitually boiled it 
before drinking, effectively preventing food-borne illness. Yet dairy policy continued to focus 
on sanctioning unregistered milk producers and milk traders, despite the fact that agencies 
were unable to effectively enforce these measures. 
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In response to these problems, the Smallholder Dairy Project20 sought to introduce evidence-
based alternative policies for improving the quality of milk – particularly raw milk (Hooton and 
Omore 2007; Omore and Baker 2011). Active between 1997 and 2005, the project studied 
milk value chains, and found that the majority of milk contamination took place at the stage of 
distribution and retailing. Consumers commonly boiled milk before drinking it, which killed the 
pathogens. However, outlets known as ‘milk bars’ posed a potential health risk, because they 
did not boil milk. These findings led the project to work with informal milk traders and retailers 
to identify feasible ways that these actors could prevent contamination. 
The project worked with a total of 80 small traders who distributed milk on bicycles in three 
districts. Project implementers used a participatory strategy to engage with traders, build 
trust and design practices and technologies appropriate to their situation. Based on this 
process, the project provided training to traders on how to identify milk contamination, how to 
use simple test kits and how to prevent contamination throughout their handling of milk. Prior 
to the intervention, most traders carried milk in simple plastic buckets, which could increase 
the risk of contamination. In response, the project developed an improved metal canister 
designed to be carried on a bicycle, and sold it to traders at a subsidised price. Both before 
and after the intervention, the project assessed traders’ practices and tested contamination 
levels of the milk they carried. 
The intervention appeared to reduce levels of milk contamination; the proportion of milk with 
high levels of contamination fell from 71 to 55 per cent among traders using plastic 
containers, and from 48 to 42 per cent among those using metal containers.21 Use of metal 
containers appeared to be associated with lower risks, but there was also significant 
improvement among traders who received training but did not use metal containers. Traders 
reported that customers preferred milk delivered in metal canisters, and that this technology 
also reduced spillage during transport. However, they were reluctant to buy the canisters 
because their equipment was frequently confiscated by officials. They thus preferred the 
cheaper plastic containers, which could easily be replaced. 
The intervention occurred at the same time as a highly politicised public debate about the 
safety of milk in Kenya. Seeking to expand their market share, large manufacturers of 
packaged ultra-high temperature (UHT) milk funded a public relations campaign aiming to 
convince government and consumers that raw milk was unsafe and frequently adulterated by 
milk traders. In response, a coalition of civil society groups and research organisations 
countered these claims and advocated for government to support small milk traders. They 
referred to evidence from the ILRI studies to argue that small traders were no more likely to 
adulterate their products than large manufacturers. They also argued that a food safety 
‘scare’ would endanger public nutrition by reducing milk consumption (milk is a key source of 
protein for many people in Kenya). These advocacy efforts contributed to a policy reform that 
promoted a more ‘facilitative’ approach to informal milk traders. 
3.3 Improving food safety in Nigerian butcheries through 
business associations 
Bodija market is an important centre for processing and retailing animal products in south-
western Nigeria. According to research by ILRI, meat in the market posed considerable 
health risks to both producers and consumers. Ninety-eight per cent of meat contained 
bacterial pathogens, while 67 per cent contained zoonotic pathogens and 46 per cent 
contained environmental contaminants (Grace et al. 2012a; Grace et al. 2012b).  
                                               
20 The project was implemented by the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development, ILRI and the Kenya Agricultural 
Research Institute, and funded by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development. 
21 The study methodology does not allow this change to be attributed to the intervention. The study also does not describe what 
proportion of improvements were associated with using the new milk canisters, compared to simply receiving training. 
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Butchers working in the market often fell ill from gastrointestinal disease, with those who 
used bad hygiene practices being most likely to be affected. Although the municipal 
government oversaw the market, it had not been able to adequately regulate food safety.22 In 
response, ILRI implemented a training programme in 2009. 
Bodija market included at least 22 self-organised butchers’ associations, whose members 
were meat processors, as well as retailers and cattle owners. The associations provided 
training, credit and social support; they also mediated conflicts among members and 
interacted with officials. The members of an association all tended to have similar hygiene 
practices. The researchers concluded that this tendency could indicate either that the 
associations helped regulate their members’ behaviours or that butchers with similar 
practices simply tended to group together. 
The ILRI project chose to work with butchers’ associations to improve butchers’ hygiene 
practices. The research team presented their findings at specially organised workshops, 
trained butchers about which behaviours created the greatest risks, and listened as butchers 
discussed their own experiences. This led to the development of a set of feasible best 
practices for butchers. Participants in the workshops received certificates to post for their 
customers. ILRI conducted surveys of butchers’ practices before and after the workshop, and 
compared participants and non-participants in order to assess whether butchers’ 
associations had disseminated the best practices to non-participants. 
The ILRI studies produced two key findings: first, gender had a major influence on food 
safety outcomes. Women butchers were far more likely to use good hygienic practices, and 
butchers’ groups with more women members had lower levels of contamination. The groups 
with the best overall hygiene had on average 40 per cent female membership, while other 
groups had on average only 15 per cent. These effects were statistically significant. 
The second finding was that training appeared to improve certain hygiene practices. For 
example, 85 per cent of butchers reported using disinfectant after the training, compared to 
48 per cent beforehand.23 Furthermore, the butchers’ associations seemed to have diffused 
these behaviours among their members; training attendees and non-attendees were equally 
likely to report using many key hygiene practices.24 Qualitative evidence supported this 
conclusion, with leaders of the associations being supportive of the project, and reporting 
that they were pressuring members who had not been trained to learn from those who had 
participated in the ILRI training. 
3.4 Lessons from food safety interventions 
Experimental food safety interventions provide important lessons for nutrition programming. 
Beyond their direct contribution to better nutrition25 these efforts offer lessons for how 
nutrition-focused projects might use similar approaches to improve the nutrient content of 
products in informal markets. First, the ILRI research indicates that policies seeking merely to 
exclude the informal sector are unlikely to improve food safety or nutritional quality – and 
                                               
22 The Bodija meat processing facility is managed by the municipality. Officers regularly interact with butchers to collect taxes 
and fees. Although environmental sanitary officers are responsible for maintaining hygiene standards, in practice they are 
unable to effectively regulate most of the activities. 
23 The authors acknowledge that the before/after methodology cannot attribute the change to the training. However, other 
qualitative information collected suggests that the training contributed to these changes. 
24 There were exceptions: attendees had on average significantly cleaner slaughter and sale areas, and were significantly more 
likely to use disinfectant. 
25 Frequent gastrointestinal illness is a primary driver of malnutrition, particularly in children. Thus lower rates of contamination 
and risks of disease can directly contribute to undernutrition reduction. Other types of food safety interventions can also have 
nutritional impacts; for example, efforts to reduce aflatoxin in maize and groundnuts could contribute to reducing stunting, since 
eating aflatoxin-contaminated foods contributes to stunting in young children (Gong et al. 2002). 
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may actually be counterproductive, leading to lower quality.26 Although informal markets can 
contain major hazards – and inadequate nutrient levels – some perform very favourably 
compared to formal sector alternatives. Available experience suggests that this variability 
also applies to nutritional quality: some informal businesses produce foods of high nutritional 
quality, including even foods that must achieve high nutrient densities such as 
complementary foods for infants.27 The lesson is that interventions should assess market 
performance on a case-by-case basis, and should target the specific problems faced. 
Second, food safety and nutrition programmes should also help to reform anti-informal sector 
policies.28 Merely reducing inappropriate regulatory pressure on small businesses has 
potential to increase small businesses’ capacities and create incentives for them to improve 
product quality. However, the positive effects of such reforms have not been rigorously 
tested. Anecdotal evidence comes from cases where complex registration requirements have 
prevented businesses from adopting nutrition-relevant upgrades such as fortification 
(Robinson et al. 2014b) (see the case of fortification in Tanzania in Box 1.4, above). Further, 
regulatory pressure creates distrust and makes it more difficult for public and civil society 
programmes to engage small businesses in order to facilitate better performance. In short, 
food safety research suggests that food-based nutrition programmes would also benefit from 
a ‘facilitative’ approach to informal businesses. 
Third, the ILRI projects demonstrate that ‘light-touch’ interventions centred around training 
can deliver substantial improvements in product quality, even in the absence of technological 
or infrastructure upgrades. In both the Kenya and Nigeria cases, there were measurable and 
statistically significant improvements in bacteriological contamination following intervention. 
Yet the food safety projects also suggest that there are limits to what can be achieved 
through training alone, and that policymakers and donors need to be realistic about the 
improvements that can be expected in the short term. After the training sessions in Kenya 
and Nigeria, nearly half of all samples continued to have unacceptably high levels of 
contamination. Yet the fact that ‘light-touch’ interventions do not wholly resolve the 
underlying problem should not prevent donors and public agencies from supporting this 
approach; this point is discussed further in the conclusion of this report. Finally, there is a 
need for more research, particularly on how social factors – notably gender – shape the 
outcomes of intervention, and about the potential of working with and through existing market 
institutions and business organisations. After considering lessons from two other types of 
intervention, these points are discussed in the conclusion. 
Finally, it is important to note that, thus far, food safety interventions targeting the informal 
sector have remained limited to small-scale pilots. These efforts help to demonstrate the 
potential of this approach, but larger-scale programmes accompanied by rigorous 
assessments are needed in order to be able to address issues of cost-effectiveness and 
standardisation. With this limitation in mind, the next section examines a policy area where 
informal sector interventions have been subjected to relatively large-scale, systematic 
assessments. 
                                               
26 No studies were identified examining whether crackdowns on informal businesses impact the nutritional quality of foods. The 
evidence on food safety, however, suggests that such an effect is possible. Testing this through new research is a priority. This 
evidence could help to encourage evidence-based reform of food and nutrition policies and a more facilitative approach to 
informal businesses. 
27 A survey of infant complementary foods in Ghana found that the nutrient content of products produced by small enterprises 
varied widely. While some contained inadequate levels of key micronutrients, others met or exceeded international standards 
(Masters et al. 2011). 
28 Such reforms could include streamlining business registration requirements, reducing registration fees or simplifying minimum 
technical standards for small businesses. 
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4 Case study: Improving health care through 
informal medicine sellers 
4.1 Background 
Since the 1990s, more than 20 health projects and interventions in several African countries 
have sought to influence how informal businesses sell medicines, with the objective of 
improving the health outcomes of treatment. Many of these programmes target antimalarial 
drugs, aiming to ensure that medicine sellers sell legitimate and effective drugs, and that 
drugs are used appropriately and in the correct dosages. As with food safety programmes, 
these health-care programmes aim to affect the behaviours of large numbers of small 
businesses in the markets that serve the poor. They offer important lessons for food and 
nutrition because they have received substantial funding and have been the subject of 
impact assessments, which have formed the basis of several systematic reviews (Brieger    
et al. 2004; Goodman et al. 2007; Smith et al. 2009; Wafula and Goodman 2010).29 
Informal health-care businesses provide a large portion of the medications and treatments 
used by poor people. In sub-Saharan African countries, between 15 and 80 per cent of the 
population uses private medicine sellers as their first choice for treating child illness, with a 
median around 50 per cent (Brieger et al. 2004; Greer, Akinpelumi and Madueke 2004). 
People use informal medicine sellers because they tend to be located closer to where they 
live (compared to both public health facilities and registered private pharmacies) and 
because they are perceived to be more friendly and accessible. Informal sellers also provide 
drugs at a lower cost, since they do not charge fees for access or diagnostic tests (as health 
facilities commonly do), and since they often sell cheaper, lower-quality drugs or sell drugs in 
small doses. Medicine sellers also often provide credit to customers, which enables low-
income households to access medical care during periods of need. 
 
Box 4.1 Similarities in markets for health and for nutrient-rich foods 
Improving the poor’s access to health care and to nutrient-rich foods entails a common set of 
challenges for market-based approaches. First, many of the market problems described above 
affect food and medicines in similar ways. In particular, information asymmetries are strong in both 
cases: people buying medicines do not know precisely what condition they have, the effectiveness 
of various treatments or the quality of the various drugs available. Similarly, those buying nutrient-
rich foods often do not know their nutrient content or how to prepare them. In both cases, it is not 
simply a matter of creating low-cost products, but also of ensuring that they are used in a relatively 
precise way (in nutrition, this is particularly the case for infant feeding). If anything, the market 
problems are more severe in health care than in nutrient-rich foods: while correctly prescribing 
drugs and treatments requires specialist knowledge, when it comes to food (particularly 
unprocessed food), consumers often can use ‘proxy characteristics’ to distinguish good quality from 
bad (Pelto and Armar-Klemesu 2011). 
 
Despite the advantages that allow informal sellers to serve low-income groups, the quality of 
the drugs and medical care they provide can be deficient. A study by Iqbal et al. in 
Bangladesh found that only 18 per cent of drug prescriptions by village doctors in one 
location were appropriate to the condition to which treatment was sought (Iqbal et al. 2013: 
36). This can happen because medicine sellers are ill-informed, or simply sell customers the 
                                               
29 Given the large number of interventions and studies, a complete review is beyond the scope of this report. Instead, it 
endeavours to highlight the key findings from these interventions and the implications they might have for projects targeting 
nutrition. 
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drugs or treatments they request, whether or not they are appropriate for the patient or 
condition. It is also the result of using fake or poorly manufactured drugs. A study in Kenya 
found that only 4 per cent of chloroquine (an antimalarial) was given to children in  
appropriate doses, while a survey in Cameroon found that 38 per cent of chloroquine and   
74 per cent of quinine sold in shops either did not contain enough of the active ingredient or 
contained incorrect ingredients (Goodman et al. 2007). Yet despite these major quality 
problems, the fact that informal medicine sellers are the first choice for an important portion 
of the poor, and that even formal health-care providers often fail to meet quality standards 
(Sudhinaraset et al. 2013), means that governments and public health authorities cannot 
afford to ignore them. The challenge is that regulatory authorities in African countries do not 
have sufficient staff or resources to identify the majority of medicine sellers, let alone to 
enforce regulatory requirements. Several systematic reviews have therefore highlighted the 
need for alternative approaches for motivating medicine sellers to improve their performance 
(Wafula, Miriti and Goodman 2012). 
4.1.1 Types of intervention 
Interventions targeting informal medicine sellers have combined different approaches, which 
can be categorised as: (1) training and capacity building for medicine sellers, (2) demand 
generation among consumers, (3) quality assurance and monitoring, and (4) creating an 
enabling environment through policies and political support (Brieger et al. 2004). Training has 
been the dominant strategy of many interventions, which ranged in intensiveness and 
duration. At the ‘light-touch’ end, a programme in Nigeria trained private wholesale agents, 
who were expected to pass on this information to their clients – who are medicine sellers – 
during sales visits. Other training processes were much more involved: a project in a rural 
district of Uganda used a participatory approach to adapt training messages and secure buy-
in from medicine sellers. It presented sellers with evidence about their current (inadequate) 
practices and, through a process of negotiation, agreed on a set of improved practices 
tailored to sellers’ needs and constraints (Greer et al. 2004). 
These interventions were delivered through different intermediaries, and this had important 
implications for their credibility and cost, as well as the sustainability of behaviour changes. 
The most common approaches interfaced with medicine sellers through project staff and 
local health workers, but some interventions also employed private sector actors themselves 
to advocate among their peers and customers. Finally, some interventions used community 
institutions as intermediaries between the project and medicine sellers in order to make use 
of local knowledge and social networks. 
Distinct from these training projects, a handful of more intensive interventions centred on 
building franchise networks of drug sellers and pharmacies. Building a franchise network 
entails large start-up costs for developing a drug procurement and distribution system, for 
encouraging individual medicine sellers to convert their businesses into franchises and for 
monitoring and ensuring that franchisee businesses comply with standards. Because of its 
cost, the high degree of behaviour change required and the fact that it is led by a central 
private sector organisation, franchising is substantially different to other interventions 
targeting the informal sector. It is discussed in more detail below. 
4.1.2 Outcomes of interventions 
Systematic reviews of medicine seller interventions have found that they have consistently 
contributed to better knowledge and prescribing practices among informal medicine sellers – 
at least in the short term (Brieger et al. 2004; Goodman et al. 2007; Smith et al. 2009; Wafula 
and Goodman 2010).30 As one review reported for interventions targeting malaria treatment: 
                                               
30 Most evaluations have been based on pre-/post- measures. Few evaluations have used robust methodologies that can 
attribute outcomes to specific intervention activities (by ruling out confounding factors). 
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All interventions reported improvements in medicine seller performance. For example, 
in Bungoma, Kenya, the proportion of sellers stocking recommended antimalarial 
drugs was 62% in outlets that had received job aids compared with 23% in controls… 
The proportion giving appropriate drugs for uncomplicated malaria increased from 2% 
to 73% after negotiation sessions in Luwero, Uganda. The proportion of sellers 
recommending or giving a correct anti-malarial drug dose also showed substantial 
improvements, increasing from 9% to 53% after training and introduction of pre-
packed antimalarial drugs in Abia, Nigeria, and from 0% to 50% after negotiation 
sessions in Uganda. 
(Goodman et al. 2007: 210) 
However, assessment and evaluation designs were not sufficient for researchers to 
determine the effectiveness or additionality of the individual project activities: for example, 
whether training would be effective in the absence of free distribution of pre-packaged drugs. 
Evaluations came to different conclusions on the effects of training when improved practices 
contravened sellers’ commercial interests; for example, whether sellers could be convinced 
not to sell inappropriate (but in-demand) drugs. Some studies found that training was 
ineffective in these cases, while others found that businesses modified their behaviour even 
when this led to lower sales (Wafula and Goodman 2010). Compared to effectiveness, 
evidence on sustainability was even scarcer; very few studies measured business knowledge 
or behaviours over time periods longer than six months following project activities.31 
Nonetheless, several reviews concluded that sustainability would require that training and 
support are provided by public agencies on an ongoing basis (Brieger et al. 2004; Smith      
et al. 2009).32 Beyond the aggregate results, looking at the implementation of individual 
programmes offers useful lessons about different approaches to informal sector 
engagement, and the types of market and institutional conditions under which they are likely 
to be effective. 
4.2 Improving malaria treatment by drug sellers in Abba, 
Nigeria 
The USAID-funded BASICS II project funded an intervention to improve the practices of 
small medicine sellers (referred to as ‘patent medicine vendors’) in order to improve the 
handling of malaria in two local government areas in Abia state. It was estimated that about 
1,000 small medicine shops operated in the project area, and that public agencies have 
difficulty regulating or even identifying them (Greer et al. 2004). The intervention relied on 
community organisations known as Catchment Area Planning and Action Committees 
(CAPACs), which acted as intermediaries. The CAPACs were made up of 20–30 community 
leaders, including health personnel and medicine sellers, and were responsible for carrying 
out inventories of all medicine sellers in their area, selecting particular sellers to act as peer 
trainers, organising training sessions and conducting follow-up visits to sellers. However, the 
committees did not have a formal role in the health system or in the enforcement of 
regulations. 
With support from the project, CAPACs organised one-day training workshops for medicine 
sellers in their areas, with ‘champion’ sellers acting as peer instructors to deliver the key 
messages. The use of peer trainers improved credibility and communication, and was 
reported to be more cost-effective. The core messages provided in training sessions were: 
(1) treating children under five with fever using an appropriate (preferably pre-packaged) 
dose of government-recommended antimalarial drug, (2) referring children with signs of 
                                               
31 In one review, only five of the 21 studies measured seller behaviour one year after the intervention. The majority (12 studies) 
measured changes after only three months, which is inadequate for assessing sustainability (Smith et al. 2009). 
32 One study provided indicative evidence: after four years during which the project provided annual refresher training sessions 
for sellers, the vast majority continued to follow the recommended treatment guidelines (Marsh et al. 1999). 
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severe illness to a health facility, and (3) counselling customers to use insecticide-treated 
bednets. The project was eventually able to train 832 medicine sellers. This was coordinated 
with other activities, including public awareness campaigns and the introduction of 
antimalarial drugs packaged in the correct doses for specific age groups. This both increased 
access to high-quality drugs for medicine sellers and simplified the task of prescription. The 
project also provided businesses that participated in training with certificates to display in 
their shops. Through radio ads, the project marketed the certificates as indicators of quality 
health care. 
The project evaluation found that it had a large positive influence on medicine sellers’ 
practices. The proportion of sellers recommending the correct dose of antimalarial drugs 
increased from 9 per cent pre-intervention to 53 per cent post-intervention. The project points 
out that this represents the combined effects of the training, public awareness campaigns 
and the new pre-packaged drugs. Other practices did not improve, including informing 
customers about the signs of severe illness, referring severe cases to a health facility or 
recommending insecticide-treated bednets. 
The CAPACs played a key role in the project; through local social networks they were able to 
identify informal medicine sellers that were ‘invisible’ to public authorities. Community 
leaders’ high social standing also meant they could pressure sellers to attend training and 
comply with recommendations. Support from government agencies was also important. 
Medicine sellers were initially reluctant to attend training, concerned that authorities would 
use this as an opportunity to levy taxes. It was necessary for managers from the state health 
services to reassure medicine sellers. Other political support was also necessary; the project 
had to assure doctors and nurses that the programme was not a blanket endorsement of 
untrained drug sellers. 
The Nigeria project targeting medicine sellers and antimalarial drugs offers key lessons for 
other informal sector interventions: first, it highlights the potential of working with appropriate 
community-level institutions. Where local institutions exist and are influential and well-
connected, they can enable projects to rapidly identify and reach a large number of informal 
businesses in a target area. Second, the combination of training, increasing access to good-
quality products and running public awareness campaigns contributed to better performance 
among informal businesses, at least for some key behaviours. Other behaviours remain 
more difficult to change. Finally, the case highlights the importance of securing political 
support from power brokers (not only government) and of allaying informal businesses’ fears 
about engaging with authorities. 
4.3 Developing drug shop franchises in Ghana and Kenya 
As mentioned above, franchise programmes function differently to the other medicine seller 
interventions discussed. A franchise model entails a central business (the franchise owner) 
licensing other businesses (the franchisees) to use its brand and access its services on the 
condition that they comply with specific standards. This model must create incentives for 
both parties: the owner takes a portion of revenues from franchisees, while the franchisees 
benefit from better sales or lower costs. These conditions are slightly different in a social 
franchise, where the owner (often a non-governmental organisation or social enterprise) 
forgoes profits in order to achieve social goals (e.g. extending coverage of good-quality 
medical treatment). A successful franchise provides products of consistent quality while 
achieving efficiencies of scale through large numbers of franchisees. It differentiates its 
products through a brand that is recognised by consumers. In health markets in sub-Saharan 
Africa, franchising has several potential advantages: 
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 It can shape the behaviour of small medicine sellers (through training, monitoring and 
enforcement) while covering costs. This requires generating sufficient revenues. 
 It can create both positive and negative incentives for medicine sellers to use good 
products and practices, combining better sales, lower costs and the threat of being 
sanctioned if they fail to comply. 
 Through branding, it can increase the visibility and desirability of participation for 
businesses, while differentiating the product among consumers. 
There are a handful of franchising networks covering medicine sellers in African countries 
(Brieger et al. 2004), and these networks employ different models. In Ghana, the CareShop 
franchise grew by ‘converting’ existing, semi-formal drug sellers, while in Kenya the 
CFWshops franchise helped willing entrepreneurs (often women who had worked as nurses) 
to establish new businesses. Both franchises were initiated by non-profit organisations, and 
have continued to rely on grants from development agencies and individual donors (Rangan 
and Lee 2014; Segrè and Tran 2008). In 2008, the CareShop franchise included 276 shops 
across Ghana. CFWshops operated 83 clinics in Kenya in 2009, and served more than 
500,000 people. Franchise shops appeared to provide slightly better treatment than other 
medicine sellers; in Ghana 18 per cent of CareShops prescribed malaria drugs correctly, 
compared to 10 per cent of non-franchise shops. 
Despite their coverage, neither the Ghanaian nor Kenyan franchises have become viable on 
a purely commercial basis. In both cases, franchise owners struggled to incentivise 
franchisees to comply with practices key to the franchise’s overall success. For example, 
franchisees were supposed to stock only approved drugs and brands, and to source drugs 
only through the franchise’s own procurement system. However, in practice they continued to 
stock non-approved drugs and to purchase from other wholesalers. One reason for this was 
consumer preferences; in Ghana, consumers strongly prefer familiar brands of drugs, and 
thus franchisee businesses insisted on stocking many more brands and products than the 
franchise system could handle efficiently. Meanwhile, in both Ghana and Kenya, franchise 
managers had to cut back on monitoring because it was too expensive to send agents to 
remote rural shops. Even more fundamentally, in both cases, franchise owners were unable 
to collect royalty fees or loan repayments from franchisees. Although the franchise owners 
should have delicensed franchisees who did not pay, in practice they were reluctant to do so, 
because this would compromise their social objectives. Managers faced a trade-off between 
making the franchises profitable (by selling at higher prices and targeting urban areas) and 
reaching poor people in rural areas. In the end, the inability to collect fees led to the collapse 
of the Ghana CareShop franchise after five years. Meanwhile, in Kenya, CFWshops has 
shifted its focus to full-service clinics rather than drug shops, since clinics can legally offer a 
wider range of drugs. It is also considering focusing on urban areas, which might allow the 
franchise to function on a purely commercial basis. 
While these cases suggest the potential of franchising for delivering better-quality products 
by converting networks of informal businesses, they also highlight the major challenges to 
the viability of franchising under prevailing market conditions. While in theory franchises 
provide profit incentives to franchisees, in practice, businesses’ main motivations for joining 
the franchises were not increased profits, but rather social status and access to training. 
Similarly, while franchise owners had a commercial incentive to monitor retailers’ 
performance, in practice the costs of doing so were too great, and could not be recovered 
through fees. There may be ways to reduce the costs of monitoring, for example by limiting 
franchises to a small number of centrally produced, ready-to-sell products, or focusing on 
narrower geographic areas. Overall, franchising schemes appear to be useful market-based 
approaches for influencing the informal sector, but their reach appears limited to urban areas 
and to middle-income groups. Under current conditions in most SSA countries, franchises 
continue to rely on grant funding and social subsidies. Whether they can be viable on a 
purely commercial basis is unclear. 
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4.4 Lessons from medicine seller interventions 
The case of informal medicine sellers and the interventions to improve their performance 
underscores the importance of including the informal sector in market-based programmes. It 
is well documented that informal businesses increase access to health care for low-income 
populations (Sudhinaraset et al. 2013; Wafula et al. 2012). While this health care is often of 
poor and unreliable quality, were it not for small medicine sellers, health outcomes would be 
worse than at present (Goodman et al. 2007; Wafula et al. 2012).33 This parallels the 
situation in the food sector, where the informal sector already contributes to nutrition, but 
faces substantial quality problems. Research on improving health-care performance is useful 
because it suggests how food-based policies and programmes could be designed to improve 
the nutritional performance of informal businesses. 
First, medicine seller interventions demonstrate that there are alternative means of 
influencing business behaviour beyond command-and-control-style regulation. Medicine 
seller interventions tended to use a combination of approaches: providing training and follow-
up, mobilising community and professional institutions, and introducing new products. The 
first of these, training, was a major activity in all of the projects reviewed. The research 
shows that training can improve business behaviours, even in the absence of other 
interventions or incentives (Wafula and Goodman 2010). However, consistent follow-up and 
retraining – provided by projects, health-care workers or community bodies – appear 
necessary for these improvements to be sustained. Although only a handful of the 
interventions sustained activities beyond a few months, the evidence these programmes 
generated suggests that training with follow-up can be successful even in the absence of 
formal monitoring and enforcement (ibid.). If this trend holds in the case of food and nutrition, 
it is a powerful endorsement for training-based interventions, since the enforcement of 
nutrition standards has proven to be extremely difficult across countries and markets in SSA 
(Robinson et al. 2014a; Robinson et al. 2014b). 
Second, in addition to training, the case of medicine sellers suggests ways to leverage 
businesses’ reputations to sustain behaviour changes. Two aspects of business reputation 
were important: customers’ perceptions of a business and its standing with key institutions 
and professional bodies. Interventions sought to mobilise the first of these, customer 
perceptions, through awareness campaigns that encouraged consumers to demand good 
practices from medicine sellers. Interventions such as the Nigeria malaria project also 
created ‘light-touch’ certification programmes in order to help participating businesses to 
attract customers. In the Nigeria case, the combination of public awareness with this 
certification appeared to encourage businesses to seek out training; the project hoped it 
would also encourage them to comply with good practices in the longer term.34 What is 
surprising is that this reputational motivation did not necessarily depend on sales: in several 
cases, businesses chose to participate in programmes not because this increased their sales 
but because it enhanced their reputations and improved their relationships with authorities 
(Greer et al. 2004; Segrè and Tran 2008). This is perhaps somewhat unique to health care, 
since professional associations and qualifications are especially crucial in this sector.35 
                                               
33 The problem is better known than the solutions; there are many more studies documenting the importance of informal 
medicine sellers in providing access to health care and the problems with this health care than there are studies examining 
effective solutions in this sector (Wafula et al. 2012). 
34 None of the studies had a design that allowed outcomes to be associated with particular activities (Goodman et al. 2007; 
Wafula and Goodman 2010). It is not possible to know whether, for example, light-touch certification or the provision of pre-
packaged medicines led to additional improvements in medicine seller performance. Project reports provide a plausible logic for 
how these elements may contribute to motivating business participation, but cannot demonstrate whether this effect occurred 
consistently. 
35 In health care, business member bodies (such as drug vendors’ associations) and professional associations (such as doctors’ 
associations) can shape businesses’ access to drug supplies and their relationships with regulators. In contrast, professional 
motivations may be less powerful in the food sector, since it is less professionalised and less regulated and since food 
businesses do not require access to specialised drug supplies. Consumer preferences for cost, convenience or taste are likely 
more important drivers of the behaviours of small food businesses. 
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Informal social pressure also appeared important. In Nigeria, training and follow-up were 
organised by the committee of community leaders, and this appeared to increase contact 
with medicine sellers (Brieger et al. 2004).36 More robust evidence is needed to establish 
models through which professional reputation or community standing could drive the more 
difficult behaviour changes and encourage sustainability. 
Third, interventions can facilitate the behaviour changes promoted through training by 
introducing products that simplify the required changes. Several medicine seller interventions 
introduced drugs packaged in age-specific doses that discouraged under-dosing and 
simplified the task of measuring correct doses. Indeed, a similar approach has already been 
used in nutrition interventions, where single-serving micronutrient powders are distributed to 
households with children of 6–24 months old. Another potential avenue for simplifying 
behaviour changes would be providing small food businesses with appropriate technology to 
reduce nutrient losses during processing. However, delivering new products and 
technologies to informal businesses requires viable supply chains, and – as was discovered 
by the franchise networks – it is very difficult to motivate retailers to use a single product or 
supply chain – they are likely to combine multiple chains wherever this is advantageous. This 
is likely to be particularly problematic in the case of food retailers, since food value chains 
are much more decentralised than medicine value chains.37 Further research is needed to 
assess the circumstances under which the introduction of new products is a viable and 
effective means to encourage behaviour change. 
Finally, while the medicine seller interventions highlight the potential for ‘quick wins’ in 
improving informal businesses’ performance, they also suggest the need to work with 
durable institutions that can provide ongoing oversight. This is likely to require support from 
and sustained funding for well-equipped government institutions. Project evaluations show 
that a combination of training, social marketing and new products can produce significant 
short-term results, but also that sustaining behaviour changes requires follow-up and 
reputational pressures. Thus, achieving significant change at large scale and on a 
sustainable basis will require substantial investment in permanent organisations that can 
manage these programmes. How this capacity could be built is discussed in the conclusion. 
  
                                               
36 However, reviews also identified exceptions, in which training and public awareness interventions actually led consumers to 
seek care from public facilities and avoid informal sellers. 
37 See note 23 on associating outcomes with particular project activities. 
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5 Case study: Salt iodisation and small 
producers 
5.1 Background 
Unlike the two case studies analysed above, salt iodisation is a directly nutrition-focused 
programme. It aims to address iodine deficiency disorders – particularly in children – which 
result from inadequate consumption of iodine and cause lifelong harm. Universal Salt 
Iodisation (USI) – the requirement that all salt produced or imported to a country contain a 
certain level of iodine – had been legislated in 55 developing countries by 2008 (UNICEF 
2008: 20). Salt is a good vehicle for iodine because, unlike other staple foods, it is consumed 
consistently and in roughly similar amounts by different populations, reducing the risk of 
over- or under-dosing. While USI programmes have dramatically reduced iodine deficiencies 
in a number of countries in the past two decades (WHA 2012), in some countries a 
significant portion of the population still does not have access to iodised salt. There is 
agreement that this gap is the result of iodisation programmes failing to reach small-scale 
salt producers (International Council for the Control of Iodine Deficiency Disorders 2013; 
Jooste and Andersson 2014). Small-scale salt production occurs in a number of countries in 
SSA, but its geographic scope is limited to areas near natural features such as saline lakes 
or lagoons. Where it does occur, however, there tends to be a thriving and poorly regulated 
market for domestically produced salt, which is lower cost than centrally produced salt. This 
locally produced salt is generally not iodised (see Box 5.1). The divide between centrally and 
locally produced salt can be stark: in Tanzania, 90 per cent of households use iodised salt in 
some interior regions, but less than 50 per cent do in the coastal regions where salt is 
produced (Assey 2009: 4). Furthermore, low-income and rural populations are particularly 
likely to source salt from the informal sector. This can threaten the success of USI; even 
large manufacturers may not comply with iodisation when they face competition from 
informal producers.38 This gap is increasingly recognised by USI programmes; while early 
efforts focused on large manufacturers, a growing number have targeted small-scale 
producers. 
 
Box 5.1 Small-scale producers in salt-producing countries 
Ghana: 40 per cent of domestic salt production by 5,000–10,000 small producers 
Senegal: 38 per cent of domestic salt production by more than 10,000 small producers 
Tanzania: More than 6,500 producers (no data on production levels) 
Sources: Kupka et al. (2012); Spoher and Garrett (2013). 
5.2 Three models for working with small producers 
Salt iodisation programmes targeting small producers have employed several different 
models and approaches. The first of these involves the introduction of simple technology and 
training. In Tanzania, the USI programme has promoted iodisation among both small- and 
medium-sized salt producers. The government, with support from donor agencies, has 
provided training and developed simple, hand-held spray pumps that enable small-scale 
producers to iodise their products at low cost. This technology has led to thousands of 
                                               
38 This is reported to be the case even though iodisation represents only a small fraction of the costs of salt production (Mannar 
and Yusufali 2013). 
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producers beginning to iodise their salt. This success comes despite regulatory agencies’ 
very limited ability to stop production by those who do not iodise. However, many producers 
still cannot afford equipment, and there are indications that it is not being used in a way that 
is sufficiently precise, with one survey finding that 24–69 per cent of salt was either under- or 
over-iodised. 
Table 5.1 Coverage of iodised salt in four salt-producing countries in SSA 
Country Percentage of households with (%): 
Some iodine in salt Adequately iodised salt Some iodine in the 
worst-performing region 
Ethiopia 23 (overall) 
13 (rural) 
N/A† 6 (Dire Dawa and Harari 
Regions) 
Ghana 27 (urban) 
41 (rural) 
35 (overall) 
23 (rural) 
15 (Northern Region) 
Senegal 56 (overall)* 
47 (rural)* 
48 (overall)* 
39 (rural)* 
N/A 
Tanzania 13 (urban) 
27 (rural) 
81 (overall) 
51 (rural) 
6 (Lindi Region) 
Notes: † Data for Ethiopia do not specify whether iodised salt is adequately iodised; *Senegal National Demographic Health 
Survey does not provide data on salt iodisation; figures shown are from Kupka et al. (2012). 
Sources: National Demographic Health surveys (Central Statistical Agency [Ethiopia] and ICF International 2012; Ghana 
Statistical Service, Ghana Health Service and ICF Macro 2009; National Bureau of Statistics and ICF Macro 2011). 
The second major approach has been to organise salt producers or to work with existing 
organisations. In Senegal and Ghana, the primary salt-producing countries in West Africa, 
thousands of small-scale producers manufacture roughly 40 per cent of domestic supplies, 
and most of these producers do not iodise salt adequately (Kupka et al. 2012; Spoher and 
Garrett 2013). In Ghana, the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) and UNICEF 
sought to introduce iodisation among producers in Nyanyano, a municipality near Accra. The 
project created a Salt Bank Cooperative involving 43 members and governed by an elected 
board. The cooperative purchased salt from its members, and processed, iodised, packaged 
and sold this salt (Spoher and Garrett 2013). GAIN provided starting capital, training and 
expertise on iodisation. However, after two years, GAIN ended its support and concluded 
that the sales margins the cooperative earned were not enough to cover its costs. Reports 
suggest that the cooperative ceased to function after GAIN withdrew its support. Meanwhile, 
in Senegal salt producers were already organised into cooperatives39 even before USI 
legislation. The cooperatives regulated access to salt production sites and also contributed to 
processing and bulking supplies and negotiating prices with traders. Recently, a donor-
funded project led by Micronutrient Initiative provided a number of cooperatives with 
iodisation equipment and training. The cooperatives charged members a fee for iodisation, 
which they aimed to recover through higher prices. The project reported considerable 
success with small-scale iodisation through this model, and the cooperatives produced more 
than 120,000 metric tonnes of iodised salt between 2007 and 2012. However, the proportion 
of this production that was iodised remained just under 50 per cent (Kupka et al. 2012). 
Programmes have thus experienced mixed results in working with salt producers’ 
organisations. This has been the case not only for small-scale, informal production, but also 
for associations of larger, formalised salt businesses. In 1994, Tanzania’s government 
sponsored the establishment of Tanzania Salt Producers Association (TASPA), which 
represented medium- and large-scale manufacturers (it does not include the small-scale, 
                                               
39 Known domestically as ‘Groupement d’Interet Economique’ (GIE). 
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artisanal producers). In 1999, the Association created a revolving fund to ensure that 
members would have a regular supply of potassium iodate. However, it has struggled to 
ensure that businesses pay in to the fund. The fund eventually collapsed when the global 
price of potassium iodate more than doubled in early 2011. It was kept in operation only 
because the government donated additional supplies. 
A third and distinct approach to salt iodisation is being pursued in Ethiopia. There, the 
government is seeking to create a centralised value chain for salt processing, and is 
requiring all salt producers to sell to large processing facilities. These facilities will perform 
processing, iodisation and packaging. In 2012, one such facility was built near Lake Afdera, 
one of the main salt-producing zones. Small-scale production will not be eliminated, but the 
government hopes that the industry will become more centralised with time.40 The Afdera 
facility is jointly owned by government and private investors, with additional support from the 
Micronutrient Initiative, GAIN and UNICEF (Adish et al. 2013). It is too soon to know whether 
this programme will be able to successfully induce small harvesters to sell into these 
centralised facilities and whether this approach will eliminate side-selling in informal markets, 
which remains a common practice at present. 
5.3 Lessons from salt iodisation 
The case of salt iodisation provides useful insights for nutrition programmes not only 
because it is directly concerned with micronutrient deficiencies, but also because it 
represents an ideal case for assessing the potential of food fortification. As mentioned above, 
salt is well-suited as a fortification vehicle:41 it is almost universally consumed, has no direct 
substitute and various social groups consume roughly similar quantities. It is also conducive 
to centralised production: the product is homogenous, relatively cheap to transport and store 
and there are relatively few places where it can be produced locally. Yet the fact that informal 
markets for salt continue to exist in many countries in SSA indicates the presence of 
underlying conditions that favour informality. Given that informal salt markets persist 
seemingly wherever saline lakes or lagoons make production possible, we might expect a 
similar or greater degree of informality to persist in markets for other fortification vehicles for 
which there are local substitutes (particularly flour and cooking oil). Second, traits that make 
salt a good fortification vehicle (particularly the limited geographic scope of production and 
the relatively simple technology required for iodisation) also suggest there could be 
significant potential in working with the informal sector. Yet the examples cited above 
highlight that achieving iodisation in informal salt markets remains challenging, despite 
progress in some countries. In addition to developing and disseminating appropriate 
technology, iodisation programmes have sought to incentivise iodisation through various 
business organisations, while addressing value chain problems that have prevented small 
businesses from accessing supplies of fortificants. 
The programmes reviewed in this section employed different models for engaging and 
influencing small salt producers, with some working with existing cooperatives, while others 
sought to create new organisations. In Ghana and Senegal, some success was reported with 
cooperatives which owned and operated iodisation and packaging facilities. Senegal was 
particularly successful; it was estimated that about 47 per cent of salt produced in the 
informal sector was being at least partially iodised (Kupka et al. 2012). In Ghana, a small 
cooperative established by GAIN appeared to cease functioning after outside support ended. 
In Tanzania, even the large producers’ association struggled to induce members to 
contribute to the central purchasing facility. In all three of these cases, external subsidies 
were needed to motivate business organisations to undertake iodisation. At the same time, 
the Senegal experience suggests that the model may be more viable when working with 
                                               
40 The government also exhibits a high degree of control over marketing, including price controls and production quotas. 
41 The exception is that iodine added to salt can be lost during storage, especially with prolonged exposure to heat or sunlight. 
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existing business organisations that already provide services to members and are embedded 
in the institutional context (Miloff 2008). 
One area where external support appears to be particularly important is in establishing 
supplies of fortification inputs (potassium iodate) to domestic producers. Supplies are a 
problem for small producers in particular, since they tend to lack storage facilities and to 
purchase small quantities due to cash flow constraints. Because these producers also tend 
to be located in remote areas, distributing to them is costly, and yet these producers are not 
able to pass on added costs to their customers, whose spending power is extremely low. 
Aggregating demand across producers and enabling bulk purchasing can go some way to 
resolving the supply problem. The projects reviewed here attempted to do this through 
government-sponsored artisanal unions in Senegal and through private business 
associations in Ghana and Tanzania. Yet, even with such systems in place, small (and even 
medium) businesses remain vulnerable to price swings in the global market (such as when 
the price of potassium iodate doubled between January and June 2011). Programmes 
should therefore anticipate the need for periodic public intervention in order to ensure a 
consistent supply (Garrett and Prczewlofsky 2013). 
In sum, experience from salt iodisation suggests the potential to successfully motivate 
(some) informal businesses to participate in mandatory fortification programmes through the 
use of simple technologies. The characteristics of salt markets mean these programmes may 
offer the best case of what can be achieved through fortification; other commodities are likely 
to be more problematic. Salt iodisation programmes have worked through cooperatives and 
business organisations that facilitate interaction with producers and provide some efficiencies 
(although they remain small-scale). At the same time, efforts to get these organisations to 
undertake salt iodisation on a sustainable basis without public support have not been 
successful – even in the case of the larger, formal business association in Tanzania. 
Underlying market conditions, particularly the very low incomes and low awareness of 
iodised salt, continue to impose constraints. Fluctuations in the price of imported inputs 
further complicate the problem. The case studies thus suggest that achieving fortification in 
informal markets will require ongoing subsidies, monitoring and intervention by governments 
and/or donor organisations. More successful models appear to be hybrid public–private 
ventures involving public agencies and producers’ organisations, with each playing well-
defined roles: the public sector provided training and technical support, regulated supplies of 
key inputs and strengthened monitoring and enforcement over time; private organisations 
aggregated demand and provided efficiencies in processing, while also providing services to 
members and regulating access to resources for small producers. These hybrid models need 
to be further explored through more rigorous research and assessment to understand the 
implications of different organisational structures. There is also a need for comparative 
market studies of other commodities targeted by fortification to assess whether the models 
used for salt are viable for other products, particularly those that are produced by larger 
numbers of small-scale businesses. 
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6 Conclusion 
6.1 Lessons for improving nutrition in the informal sector 
The cases examined above highlight both the potential and the limitations of interventions 
targeting informal sector businesses in SSA. This concluding section highlights the principle 
implications for food and nutrition programmes, and identifies the important evidence gaps 
that remain. It is worth keeping in mind why the case study interventions were deemed 
relevant to markets for nutrient-rich foods: they aimed to influence the behaviours of large 
numbers of small businesses and sought to upgrade the quality of their products to the 
benefit of low-income populations. In each case, the interventions explicitly targeted actors 
and markets that already served the poor, rather than building entirely new ones. The 
potential of these intervention approaches depends upon the extent to which they capitalise 
on existing market and institutional dynamics and lead to impacts among key populations in 
the short term. 
6.1.1 Benefits of a facilitative policy orientation 
The case studies consistently point to the substantial benefits that can result from shifting 
from an exclusionary to a facilitative approach towards informal businesses – including in 
food and nutrition policies. Across the sectors reviewed, policies that aimed to eliminate 
informal businesses were ineffective. This resulted first and foremost from regulatory bodies’ 
inability to ensure coverage and compliance among the vast majority of businesses. In some 
cases, regulatory crackdowns were actually counterproductive and led to, for example, worse 
food safety outcomes. Meanwhile, not all informal sector products are of bad quality; for 
example, some informal microenterprises in Ghana produced infant complementary foods 
that achieved adequate levels of macro- and micronutrients. These findings support the case 
for reforming policies to adopt a more facilitative approach to informal food businesses as a 
part of a nutrition and food safety agenda. It has been argued that even just legalising small 
businesses – in the absence of any form of support – creates incentives that can lead 
businesses to upgrade their products. These effects have not been rigorously tested. 
Experience in the nutrition sector shows, however, that complex regulatory requirements on 
small businesses can prevent them from adopting nutrition-relevant upgrades such as 
fortification (Pittore and Robinson 2015). Furthermore, a facilitative policy approach might 
also improve trust between businesses and public authorities, make it easier for interventions 
to reach businesses, and facilitate future efforts to improve governance of food markets 
(Grace and Omore 2007). 
6.1.2 Light-touch interventions can be effective 
Second, evidence from the case studies indicates that ‘light-touch’ interventions – in the 
absence of top-down control – can improve the performance of businesses and lead to 
better-quality products. The case study interventions were all ‘light-touch’ in that they did not 
involve formal mechanisms for controlling businesses’ behaviours; instead, they relied on 
behaviour-change techniques, training and participatory approaches, accompanied by 
reputational incentives and goodwill among businesses. Yet the impacts were not 
insignificant; in the food safety cases, post-training evaluations found approximately            
20 per cent fewer cases of contaminated milk in Kenya and 77 per cent more butchers in 
Nigeria using hygienic practices, while the medicine seller interventions saw good drug 
prescribing practices increase from less than 10 per cent before intervention to as much as 
50–70 per cent afterwards. Among ‘light-touch’ interventions, some approaches may work 
better than others. A review of medicine seller interventions concluded that participatory 
approaches which involved businesses in designing activities and selecting feasible 
behaviour changes appeared to lead to greater impacts than pre-designed training 
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programmes (Smith et al. 2009). These approaches are readily applicable to nutrition 
interventions. Indeed, the Tuboreshe Chakula project in Tanzania is an example of a 
nutrition-related project that aims to be responsive to the circumstances and needs of small 
businesses. Interventions can also draw on the existing knowledge of small food businesses 
(for example, intimate knowledge of consumers’ preferences for foods) to design products, 
behaviours and business models that are more feasible and more readily adopted by 
informal food businesses. 
While the case studies indicated that light-touch approaches can be effective, methodological 
limitations inhibited a more precise assessment of how. Because most of the studies were 
pre-/post- evaluations, confounding factors cannot be ruled out, and observed changes 
cannot be directly attributed to intervention activities. Furthermore, the studies do not allow 
us to determine which activities were effective (e.g. training vs introduction of new products), 
nor whether activities need to be implemented in tandem or are effective on their own. A 
complete assessment of the methodological limitations of the various studies is beyond the 
scope of this report. Yet this review highlights the need for rigorous study and intervention 
designs that allow measurement of the contributions of different approaches and activities. 
Furthermore, there is a need to assess the cost-effectiveness of various approaches in a 
rigorous way. In the case studies, only a small number of studies reported cost-effectiveness, 
and – given their short-term and experimental nature – it is unclear whether these results are 
meaningful for estimating cost-effectiveness at larger scale. For the moment, what can be 
said is that ‘light-touch’ interventions overall appeared to be able to reach substantial 
numbers of the businesses operating in a given market, and that they improved performance 
over a short time period and using modest investments of donor funds. 
At the same time, the case studies also suggest the degree of change that ‘light-touch’ 
interventions can be expected to deliver. After the training of food vendors in Kenya and 
Nigeria, nearly half of all samples continued to have unacceptably high levels of 
contamination, while medicine sellers in Nigeria were more likely to prescribe correct doses, 
but no more likely to refer patients to health centres or recommend bednets. It is important to 
recognise the fact that moderate or imperfect improvements can still have substantial 
positive health and social impacts; a moderate improvement across a large number of 
businesses can contribute to significant improvements in nutrition, particularly if these 
businesses serve low-income populations. Ultimately, choosing among food-based 
interventions requires comparing the degree of change they achieve, the populations they 
reach and their cost-effectiveness. At present, the evidence is not adequate to allow such 
comparisons between informal sector approaches and more conventional food-based 
approaches.42 
6.1.3 Reputational motivations for business participation 
Equally important as demonstrating that light-touch interventions can be effective, the case 
studies provided suggestive findings about how public agencies, project implementers and 
social enterprises can work with informal businesses to improve their performance. One 
surprising finding was that indirect factors were consistently as or more important than short-
term changes in revenues and costs in motivating behaviour change. This finding can be 
explained by considering the context in which informal businesses operate, generally 
characterised as ‘between’ formal public and private institutions (e.g. regulators, private 
standards) and ‘traditional’ institutions such as chiefs and notables, religious leaders and 
market associations. The semi-legal status of most small food businesses means that their 
right to access services and use public infrastructure (e.g. roadsides or markets), or indeed 
their very existence can be challenged. In this context, participation in project activities, the 
                                               
42 Common conventional food-based interventions include large-scale fortification, distribution of micronutrient supplements and 
so-called ‘home garden’ promotion. 
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holding of a training certificate or membership in business associations can improve 
businesses’ relationships with authorities and help them to access needed services. These 
reputational factors can also improve trust among businesses’ customers. Projects and 
franchise schemes can leverage this motivation by securing support from key political actors 
and by helping participating informal businesses to bolster their legitimacy. Yet this does not 
mean that profit does not matter; informal enterprises are ultimately businesses and must 
generate a commercial return if they are to persist. Many projects recognise the dual 
importance of reputation and profitability; one project reported that businesses were eager to 
participate in training because – in addition to information about fortification – it allowed them 
to improve their financial management and manufacturing processes, leading to greater 
efficiency (Pittore and Robinson 2015). 
More surprising than the importance of reputational factors was the powerful role that social 
identity – in particular, gender – played in shaping businesses’ behaviour and performance. 
In the food safety programme in Nigeria, women butchers consistently performed better on 
food safety compared to their male peers, and even men performed better when they were 
part of groups with more women members. These findings indicate that social factors, which 
are often ignored by policies and interventions, can affect performance of informal markets 
and could mediate the impacts of interventions. It is not unreasonable to expect that there 
may be similar social influences on variables of relevance to nutrition outcomes, such as 
propensity to substitute out nutrient-rich ingredients or provision of nutrition information to 
customers. Yet the reviewed studies did not examine the mechanisms through which social 
factors including gender affected outcomes. There is therefore a need for more research to 
identify when and how social identity significantly impacts outcomes in food markets. In the 
meantime, available findings suggest that projects should invest in baseline social 
assessments, analyse how social factors including gender affect businesses’ and 
consumers’ behaviours, and explore opportunities to leverage these factors to strengthen 
impacts. 
6.1.4 Intensity of intervention: behaviour change versus role change 
The case studies highlight that intervention strategies need to be designed appropriately to 
the scope and scale of change they aim to achieve. In the case of medicine sellers, Brieger 
et al. (2004) distinguish between interventions seeking ‘behaviour change’ and those aiming 
for ‘role change’. Behaviour change is the less intensive approach, seeking small 
improvements in the practices of informal businesses without substantially modifying their 
relationships with customers or other value chain players. For example, ‘behaviour change’ 
interventions targeting medicine sellers discouraged them from selling counterfeit or 
ineffective drugs and encouraged them to provide correct dosages. In contrast, role change 
interventions require more intensive work with businesses, aiming to alter their basic value 
proposition. In the case of medicine sellers, role changes involved seeking to convince drug 
sellers to shift from simply selling customers the drugs they demand to providing basic 
diagnosis services: asking customers about their symptoms and offering drugs only when 
they were appropriate. Role change might also involve businesses selling new types of 
products unfamiliar to consumers (such as packaged micronutrient supplements) or shifting 
from selling a diversity of products to stocking a single brand, such as in franchising 
schemes. Regardless, the case studies showed that role changes required intensive training 
and support to businesses. In the nutrition sector, some programmes have indeed included 
role change elements, such as encouraging vegetable sellers to recommend biofortified 
vegetables to their customers and emphasising their benefits for child health (Low et al. 
2007). Nonetheless, these examples remain the exception at present. 
One way to reduce the complexity of changing behaviour is to introduce new products or to 
modify value chains in ways that simplify what is expected from businesses. For example, 
the Nigeria medicine seller project introduced antimalarial drugs that were packaged in age-
specific doses, which made it easier for sellers to prescribe correctly. In the nutrition sector, 
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the same logic supports the development of ‘pre-blends’ of micronutrients for fortification, 
which are packaged appropriately for use by small-scale millers (Pittore and Robinson 2015). 
Yet, even when new products are introduced, the distinction between behaviour changes and 
role changes remains important, and projects should be realistic about what can be achieved 
through product introduction alone. New products or processes are more likely to be taken 
up if they reinforce existing practices and existing demands (as in the case of prescribing 
antimalarial drugs) than if they represent something entirely new (as in the case of 
fortification by small millers). Precisely what interventions can reasonably expect to change 
among informal businesses – and the conditions that can facilitate these changes – are 
priorities for policy-relevant evidence on nutrition and the informal sector, as discussed next. 
6.2 Priorities for research and learning 
Despite findings from the case studies, a major evidence gap remains on the dynamics of 
informal markets and how policies and programmes can influence them in the pursuit of 
development goals. As this report has emphasised, this gap is particularly large in the case 
of food and nutrition. There is therefore a need for rigorous research on this topic, and for 
research linked to project design and implementation. This section of the report identifies 
several topics that are particular priorities for this agenda. 
6.2.1 How can interventions work with existing institutions? 
The case studies highlighted that choosing the right intermediaries contributes to the success 
of policies and programmes targeting the informal sector. The intermediaries employed by 
projects included health workers, salespeople, community leaders and locally hired staff. 
This raises the question of whether existing institutions that have relationships with informal 
businesses – such as community leaders or market associations – could amplify the reach of 
interventions and contribute to sustainability. Several of the reviewed interventions reported 
that working with existing institutions was key to winning businesses’ trust. Existing 
institutions may also have potential to reach larger numbers of businesses at lower cost. Yet 
the challenge is that many of these institutions are themselves informal, and thus including 
them as project ‘partners’ requires working in a different way.43 Nonetheless, the case 
studies provide suggestive examples of success. In Nigeria, the butchers’ associations 
helped to diffuse knowledge and skills beyond the individuals directly trained by the project. 
Meanwhile, health committees in Nigeria made up of community leaders helped identify 
medicine sellers and organised training and follow-up visits. Yet the gaps in case studies 
also suggest where these existing institutions may face limitations. No examples were 
identified of an existing institution monitoring or enforcing compliance with outcomes (i.e. 
product quality). From within the nutrition field, the involvement of the Tanzania Salt 
Producers Association in salt iodisation indicates that even relatively well-organised business 
associations may lack the capacity to enforce compliance among their members. 
Exploratory interventions and research can improve our understanding of where working with 
existing institutions would provide the greatest benefit to market-based food and nutrition 
programmes. Research comparing the different kinds of institutions (including business 
member organisations, market governance bodies, traditional authorities and civil society 
organisations) and analysing their incentive structures would inform the identification of 
which markets and which organisations should be prioritised. In addition, there is a need to 
explore how agencies and interventions could support local institutions to more effectively 
govern business activity. If successful, these institutions could help reduce the gap in the 
capacity of central regulatory bodies. Finally, local institutions may provide avenues for 
                                               
43 Although development initiatives have done extensive work with business member organisations, they have tended to think of 
these organisations as formalised, registered bodies. Evidence from a number of countries in SSA indicates that it is not formal 
associations, but a range of informal institutions that play predominant roles in governing market activity and production 
(Fafchamps 2004). 
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linking food safety and nutritional quality to commercial incentives. For example, social 
marketing campaigns could provide coordinated messaging emphasising the value of 
nutrient-rich products and promoting particular business associations that perform well (a 
variant of this approach was used when certificates were issued to trained medicine sellers in 
Nigeria). Social marketing could, for example, increase visibility to street food vendors who 
fortify their products or to traders’ associations who market a biofortified crop. 
It is important to note that various market segments have different degrees of organisation44 
and that in many cases there may be no existing institution that interacts with small 
businesses. As a starting point, interventions should focus on the businesses, markets and 
geographic locales where a degree of self-organisation already exists, as these are likely to 
represent low-hanging fruit (this is discussed further in Section 6.3, below). At the same time, 
it is clear that – under the right circumstances – training can be successful even in the 
absence of coordinating institutions (as was the case with Kenyan milk vendors). Research 
should explore the conditions under which efforts should target existing institutions, and 
where they can work effectively with ‘unaffiliated’ businesses. 
6.2.2 How can consumer knowledge be strengthened and leveraged? 
The case studies emphasise that health outcomes in informal markets depend on more than 
just the performance of businesses; consumer behaviour is a critical element. Indeed, there 
are examples where appropriate action by consumers – in the absence of any business 
upgrading – led to better health outcomes. This was the case with consumers’ practice of 
boiling milk in Kenya. The implications for nutrition are that there may be opportunities to 
leverage consumers’ existing knowledge and practices in order to strengthen interventions. 
At the very least, interventions should seek not to erode or supplant existing consumer 
knowledge and practices that contribute to nutrition. For example, one study in urban Ghana 
found that mothers knew about the health characteristics of complementary foods, and 
regularly assessed various products based on infants’ responses to them.45 This meant that 
mothers had accurate knowledge of ‘proxy factors’ that stood in for nutritional quality (Pelto 
and Armar-Klemesu 2011). There may be opportunities to incorporate such proxy factors into 
social marketing campaigns, as an alternative to introducing technical standards (such as 
formal certification systems based on product testing). Whether and how this kind of 
consumer knowledge could be linked to businesses’ incentives should be explored. At the 
most basic level, nutrition interventions might target the foods that consumers already know 
to be ‘healthy’ and seek to make them more accessible, affordable or consistent. They could 
also encourage consumers to ask specific questions of retailers (e.g. ‘What are the 
components of this infant weaning mix?’). Exploratory efforts could experiment with public 
‘scorecards’ that allow consumers to rate businesses or business associations based on the 
quality of their products and transparent business practices. Research is needed to compare 
such models and to assess their cost-effectiveness. Much could be learned from the large 
existing literature on behaviour change communications covering health products and 
practices (see, for example, Fabrizio et al. 2014; J-PAL 2011; Kremer and Miguel 2007). 
6.2.3 Potential of franchising 
Franchising represents a special case of interventions targeting the informal sector. The case 
studies of drugstore franchise networks in African countries provide initial lessons about the 
potential and challenges of this approach, but more work is needed to understand how it 
might be applied to nutrient-rich foods. The advantage of franchises is that they create a 
vested interest for owners to ensure that franchisee businesses use good practices and 
                                               
44 Strong market institutions tend to emerge when businesses are concentrated around common infrastructure and activities, 
and where there are incentives to manage collective action problems. 
45 Proxy factors used included how readily infants ate the food, their alertness and behaviour after feeding and their growth over 
time (Pelto and Armar-Klemesu 2011). 
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good-quality products. These schemes also shift responsibility for improving businesses’ 
capacity and monitoring performance and the sanctioning of non-compliance from public or 
civil society institutions to the private franchise owner. Yet to be commercially viable, a 
franchise needs to be able to motivate franchisees to act in ways that ensure commercial 
returns for the franchise owner. For example, they must motivate franchise retailers to sell 
only products provided by the franchise owner and not to use generic wholesales. 
Franchising is thus a particularly intensive type of market intervention; it requires substantial 
up-front investment and, even under the best circumstances, takes years to become 
commercially viable. The drugstore franchises reviewed in this report faced a fundamental 
challenge: generating enough revenues to cover the costs of monitoring and enforcement. In 
these cases, this was unachievable in rural areas. Yet, in contrast to drugstores, franchising 
of food products might be a simpler task. For example, a potential franchise system could 
target retailers of complementary food, and introduce fortified products by training them and 
supplying them with pre-packaged micronutrient ‘sprinkles’ (see Anim-Somuah et al. 2013a). 
Case-specific evaluations would be needed to assess the viability of these models. What is 
clear is that franchises are better suited to supplying urban areas, and appropriate for serving 
middle-income groups rather than the poor, since they depend on creating a premium brand 
and recovering additional costs through higher prices. 
6.2.4 Building governance capacity in food systems 
Training schemes, awareness campaigns and simplified technologies can go some way to 
improving market performance; yet there are limits to what can be achieved when these are 
provided through short-term interventions. Achieving sustainability ultimately will require 
more effective and consistent market governance. Reviews of medicine seller interventions 
highlighted that – at a minimum – ongoing follow-up is needed to sustain behaviour changes 
(Smith et al. 2009). This requires the presence of a network of institutions that collectively 
provide the policy framework, ongoing services to businesses and monitoring at national and 
local levels. Given the public good nature of nutrition, the role of coordinating these actions is 
best suited to public agencies with an appropriate mandate. In the health sector, researchers 
have called for informal sector interventions to be led by a government agency and 
implemented (and evaluated) at a large scale (Goodman et al. 2007). As discussed, pursuing 
a facilitative – rather than exclusionary – policy approach and working with existing 
institutions could expand the influence of current policies. Yet given the enormous capacity 
gap faced by agencies, building capacity for governance in informal markets will be a long-
term process requiring sustained investment and institutional reforms. 
Ultimately, deeper and more comprehensive market governance depends on structural 
changes in economies that create an environment conducive to formalisation among 
businesses (Porta and Schleifer 2014). As emphasised in the introduction (Section 1), the 
barriers to formalisation are formidable, and formalisation is proceeding very slowly – if at all 
– in the food sectors in SSA. Yet greater formalisation ultimately increases governments’ 
ability to monitor and govern business activity and offers businesses access to services, 
finance and infrastructure. Even though these changes will not occur in the short term, 
interventions targeting informal businesses can actually complement strategic policies aiming 
to promote formalisation. Training programmes, for example, can provide a platform for 
improving dialogue between small businesses and government agencies; this was one of the 
roles played by actors supporting informal milk traders in Kenya. Meanwhile, support to 
existing business institutions can strengthen their capacities to govern their members’ 
behaviours and strengthen their ability to engage with policy processes. Conversely, 
progress on food safety and nutrition outcomes could help address governments’ scepticism 
regarding interactions with informal businesses, itself a barrier to formalisation (Grace and 
Omore 2007). Interventions targeting informal businesses could thus strategically aim to 
provide modest improvements in outcomes in the short term, while helping to strengthen the 
conditions for market governance in the longer term. This means that the design of policies 
and programmes focused on nutrition must also harmonise with a longer-term vision for 
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improving market governance, which is ultimately the responsibility of national and local 
government. Clearly, substantial questions remain on the modalities of potential policy and 
programmes targeting nutrition in the informal sector. Yet even as exploratory interventions 
and research address the evidence gaps, policy actors can take action in the short term that 
will improve nutrition in the informal sector. These policy recommendations are summarised 
in the next and final section of the report. 
6.3 Policy messages 
This report has emphasised that there has been relatively little experience of working with 
the informal food sector in order to improve nutrition. The report has drawn key lessons from 
other areas of policy where there is a larger body of experience with the informal sector. This 
concluding section identifies important priorities and recommends actions for policy actors, 
including government agencies, elected officials, donor agencies, civil society organisations 
and social impact-oriented businesses. 
1. Ignoring the informal sector will inhibit nutrition policy. The informal sector is the 
major source of food for the majority of middle- and low-income people in developing 
countries, and this situation will persist for the next several decades. It provides a key 
channel for reaching the populations most affected by undernutrition. Furthermore, 
formal and informal businesses operate in the same markets, and the performance of 
each is linked. Ignoring the informal sector can undermine programme outcomes and 
inhibit action by formal sector companies. 
2. A more facilitative approach to the informal sector can yield nutritional 
benefits. Simply reducing punitive crackdowns on informal businesses and 
simplifying business registration requirements may contribute to better nutritional 
performance, by encouraging small businesses to ‘come out of the shadows’, giving 
them better access to services and incentivising them to improve product quality. A 
more facilitative regulatory environment will also make it easier for training 
programmes and other efforts promoting nutrition-sensitive actions by small business. 
Creating this environment will require demonstrating to policymakers the social value 
of informal businesses in order to overcome policy biases against the informal sector. 
Since many of the relevant policies are outside the food and nutrition sector, this 
requires buy-in and coordination across multiple sectoral agencies. 
3. Use ‘light-touch’ interventions to disseminate good practices. Projects found that 
programmes that identified simple technologies and provided training to small 
businesses could improve performance (lower contamination levels, better drug 
prescriptions) at low cost. Nutrition-relevant information is more likely to be of interest 
when accompanied by general business management skills to improve businesses’ 
efficiency and public standing. Participatory approaches that involve businesses 
directly can be an efficient way to identify the key constraints and solutions, and can 
build trust and motivate behaviour change. While ‘light-touch’ interventions are not 
suitable for achieving technically ‘perfect’ solutions, they should not be dismissed, 
since they have potential to generate moderate improvements across large numbers 
of businesses and consumers. 
4. Identify ‘low-hanging fruit’ opportunities. Identify contexts (specific products, 
locations and/or organisations) where interventions will be simplest to carry out and 
most likely to yield substantial impacts. The criteria for identifying these opportunities 
could include: the existence of functioning informal market institutions such as 
professional associations, existing consumer knowledge about the healthfulness of a 
particular food, easy-to-identify traits distinguishing a food from less-nutritious 
alternatives, and the existence of functioning informal value chains for the product. 
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5. Analyse social drivers of business behaviour. Factors not directly related to short-
term profit can be important motivations for businesses to adopt new behaviours, 
including professional reputation, social contribution and gender-related factors. 
Baseline studies should investigate these drivers and monitor changes over the 
course of an intervention. 
6. Work with community institutions and informal business organisations. This 
can reduce the transaction costs of reaching small businesses. These institutions can 
extend the reach of programme activities and may be able to encourage or pressure 
businesses to adopt new behaviours. Affiliation with development programmes may 
help these institutions to enhance their legitimacy. However, informal institutions have 
limited capacity; they are unlikely to be able to play the role of monitoring and 
enforcement. 
7. Maintain investments over several years to embed changes. Although training 
can generate rapid changes in behaviour, it takes several years for new practices and 
structures to become embedded in the ways businesses operate. Follow-up can help 
to embed new behaviours, even in the absence of formal monitoring or compliance 
checks. 
8. Build capacity of national, regional and local public agencies. Ultimately, short-
term projects cannot ensure sustainable impacts. There is a need for ongoing training 
and monitoring, which should be led by national or local public agencies, working with 
appropriate private sector and civil society organisations. Enabling the public sector 
to play an appropriate role – and ultimately contribute to wider processes of business 
upgrading and formalisation – requires substantial investments to build institutional 
capacity and encourage a ‘facilitative approach’ towards the informal sector. 
Policy actors can play an important role in creating a context where informal food 
markets and businesses contribute to better nutrition. They can also pursue policies and 
programmes in a way that strengthens evidence and learning about which approaches are 
most effective. In the short term, informal markets will remain a challenging environment for 
policymaking and programming. By definition, there are few data on activities, there is a 
strong bias in policymaking and informal businesses are wary of contact with authorities. 
Food and nutrition policies and programmes can respond by strengthening the evidence 
base, both regarding how interventions can influence business behaviour in informal markets 
and simply by systematically documenting where households source nutritious foods. There 
remains a great deal to learn about effective policies to improve nutritional quality in informal 
markets. Yet developing these policies is centrally important to improving the nutrition-
sensitivity of food systems; examples from other sectors show that taking a facilitative 
approach can deliver significant improvements. Nutrition policy actors should therefore invest 
in programmes and research in this area. 
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Annex Selection criteria for case studies 
The following criteria were used to select the case studies to be included in this report: 
1. Aiming to work with and alter the behaviours of informal businesses: 
Interventions were excluded if they sought only to remove informal businesses from 
the market or to convert them into distributors of centrally produced products without 
aiming to substantially influence their behaviours in ways that improve development 
outcomes. 
2. Adequate documentation of project activities and actors: Case studies needed to 
include sufficient evidence about what activities were undertaken and by whom in 
order to assess how any documented impacts were achieved. 
3. Evidence of project impacts: Case studies needed to include some description or 
measurement of impacts in terms of businesses’ behaviours, product quality and/or 
development outcomes. This criterion focused on the detail of information provided 
(whether qualitative or quantitative) rather than the specific methodology used. 
Intervention/evaluation design (experimental, pre-/post-, etc) were not the basis for 
inclusion or exclusion. 
4. Information on context and supportive conditions: The case study needed to 
provide sufficient information about the context of the intervention (market conditions, 
private sector actors, institutions and governance) to provide an indication of how 
conditions beyond immediate project activities supported or inhibited the observed 
outcomes. The majority of studies provided rather limited accounts of context and 
contributing conditions. 
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